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OVERVIEW
The start of 2016 saw a bout of instability on global financial markets against a background 
of growing uncertainty over the world economic growth outlook, doubts about the transition 
of the Chinese economy and fresh declines in oil prices. The correction of risk asset valuations 
was particularly marked in the case of banking sector assets. As well as by general factors, 
these instruments were affected by concerns over the sector’s profitability and, in some 
jurisdictions, by the high level of non-performing loans and by the uncertainty over certain 
regulatory aspects. Admittedly, since mid-February, international financial markets have been 
more stable; but uncertainty over the future course of asset pricing remains high, especially 
in a setting in which doubts persist over the global economic outlook.
On the macroeconomic front, the latest developments show weaker global economic 
growth than anticipated some months back, which has led to the downward revision of 
medium-term growth forecasts, especially in the emerging economies. Over the recent 
period the Spanish economy has held on the expansionary path seen in the previous 
months, albeit at a somewhat more moderate rate than that observed in the second half of 
2015. GDP is projected to continue increasing, this year and next, at relatively high rates 
of 2.7% and 2.3%, respectively. However, the downside risks to this scenario have 
increased appreciably in recent months.
In this setting, Spanish deposit institutions saw their consolidated assets grow in December 
2015 at a year-on-year rate of 2.5%, owing essentially to their international activity. In fact, 
their domestic business shrank once more, albeit at an increasingly moderate rate. These 
developments have been accompanied by a 3.5% decline in consolidated earnings 
compared with 2014, fundamentally associated with the downturn in income from business 
in Spain. The pressure of the very low interest rate environment in which Spanish banks 
and their euro area counterparts pursue their intermediation activity has contributed to a 
situation in which net interest income (the difference between financial revenue and 
financial costs) has fallen by close to 2% from its 2014 level. In any event, the reduction in 
provisioning owing to the lesser volume of NPLs (which are 22% down) has partly offset 
the decline in the different margins.
Doubts about the practical implications of certain regulatory developments such as the 
entry into force of the new bail-in rules in Europe and the possible effect of the limits on 
the remuneration of regulatory capital instruments such as additional tier 1 (AT1) also 
contributed to market uncertainty.
Spanish institutions’ solvency continues to increase and, in December 2015, the CET1 
capital ratio stood at 12.6%, almost 1 pp up on a year earlier.
Set out on the next page are the main factors of risk to the stability of the Spanish financial 
system which are identified in the analysis performed in this report.
The first factor is related to the low profitability of banking business. As indicated in the 
previous Financial Stability Report (FSR), the continuity over time of a low interest rate 
environment, combined with a level of activity still at the recovery phase, may affect banks’ 
solvency, through the lesser contribution of results to the generation of reserves. The second 
factor of risk refers to the possible worsening of the economic growth outlook, linked to the 
1  Key developments
2 Risk factors
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materialisation of risk scenarios of both an external and domestic nature. The final factor of 
risk, the correction of financial asset prices, affects both banks’ financial position and their 
capacity to raise market financing. As was also discussed in the previous FSR, the factors of 
risk highlighted are shared, to differing degrees, by our peers, particularly by the banking 
systems of the member countries of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The first two 
factors are currently considered to be of medium intensity, and the final factor of low intensity. 
In any event, it should be borne in mind that these three factors of risk are not mutually 
exclusive and that the materialisation of one of them might trigger that of the other two. 
Hence, for example, an unexpected downturn in global economic growth might lead to a 
correction of financial asset values and exert additional pressure on banks’ income statements.
The maintenance over time of very low – or even negative – interest rates, along with sluggish 
credit demand, restrict banks’ profit-generating capacity. As can be seen in Chart A, the 
spread between lending and deposit rates in domestic business is at a level close to historical 
lows. To date, this situation was being countered, in part, by the pass-through of the reduction 
in interest rates to the more stable sources of financing, such as bank deposits. However, the 
scope here is beginning to be exhausted as deposit rates are very close to their natural lower 
limit. Likewise, the still-high volume of NPLs and foreclosed assets on bank balance sheets 
adds an additional element of pressure on the income statement. Nonetheless, the positive 
trend of NPLs over the past two years as a result of the improvement in economic activity, the 
low interest rates implemented by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the consequent 
lower provisioning helps compensate downward pressure on margins.
However, these positive effects on loan loss provisioning will tend to peter out in an 
environment of what are already very low or negative interest rates. This situation generates 
2.1  VERY LOW INTEREST RATE 
ENVIRONMENT AND LOW 
PROFITABILITY OF BANKING 
BUSINESS IN SPAIN
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Colour ranking in the table is as follows: green denotes no risk, yellow is low risk, orange is medium risk and red is high risk. The time horizon for which these risks 
????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
1
????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????at is not 
growing, along with a high albeit diminishing level of NPLs.
2
Worsening growth outlook for the Spanish and international economies, including those economies to which Spanish institutions have
foreign exposure.
3
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? the risk 
premium of sovereign and private issues.
RISK FACTORS (a) TABLE 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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for banks additional challenges such as the maintenance of prudent management in the 
extension of credit at rates that compensate sufficiently the risk incurred.
Additionally, if we use the 12-month EURIBOR to separate the two components of net 
interest income (see Chart B), on the asset side, the difficulty can be seen for institutions to 
increase income in recent years. On the liabilities side, it should be underlined that the 
spread between the 12-month EURIBOR and the average interest rate paid on deposits has 
been negative in recent years.
Under these conditions and with returns on equity (ROE) below the cost of capital, Spanish 
banks, like many of their European counterparts, should gain even greater efficiency 
through cost savings and seek to adapt their business model to the new conditions which 
includes strengthening income through the provision of services to their customers and 
attempting to bring their strategy, including any possible mergers and acquisitions, into 
line with the new financial and regulatory setting.
In recent months, the risks of more unfavourable macroeconomic developments than 
projected in the baseline scenario have increased, both in the case of the global and Spanish 
economies (see Charts C and D). In the first case, there are two main sources of uncertainty. 
The first has to do with a potentially more marked downturn than anticipated in the emerging 
economies. The second relates to an increase in geopolitical tensions in certain areas. The 
materialisation of any of these risks might affect Spain’s financial sector through twin 
channels. First, it would damage the activity of banks with greater exposure to the economies 
most affected. Further, it would raise the credit risk of their portfolio of assets in Spain, 
insofar as the Spanish economy were adversely affected. Besides these external risks, 
another source of risks to economic growth in Spain stems from the current political 
uncertainty insofar as this situation adds doubts about the course of economic policies.
Despite the fact that there are currently no signs of excessive pricing on domestic financial 
markets, the bout of instability in early 2016 highlights the substantial sensitivity of prices to 
changes in investor sentiment (see Charts E and F). In this respect, the uncertainty surrounding 
the international macroeconomic outlook is a major factor of risk to the course of prices on 
international and domestic financial markets. Any future price correction might affect the 
stability of the Spanish financial system through various channels. First, a tightening of 
financing conditions for the different sectors, including financial institutions, might come about 
and impair asset quality through the adverse impact on economic growth. Furthermore, banks 
might also be harmed by the reduction in the value of the assets held in their trading books.
2.2  WORSENING OF THE 
GROWTH OUTLOOK FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL AND 
SPANISH ECONOMIES
2.3  FINANCIAL ASSET PRICE 
ADJUSTMENTS
SOURCE: Consensus Forecasts.
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The foregoing factors of risk are discussed and analysed in greater detail throughout this 
FSR. This analysis is complemented by an assessment of recent solvency developments, 
which arrives at the conclusion that banks are, overall, in a favourable position to face 
these risks.
Chapter 3 offers, for the first time, a description of macroprudential policy, in terms both of 
its objectives and of the instruments available to attain such objectives. In turn, the first 
decisions adopted by the Banco de España in this connection – on the countercyclical 
capital buffer and the designation of systemic institutions, along with the capital 
requirements associated therewith – are presented.
3 Other matters
SOURCE: Datastream.
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1 MACROECONOMIC RISKS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
The global financial markets showed a high level of volatility in the opening months of 2016, 
linked to several different factors (Chart 1.1). First, doubts remained over the transition of the 
Chinese economy. Further, there were some downward revisions in growth forecasts for the 
advanced economies, despite significant growth drivers. Indeed, one of these, the marked 
decline in oil prices, caused concern owing to the adverse effect it might exert both on energy 
companies and on oil-producing countries. And finally, the liquidity problems in certain 
markets might have contributed to exacerbating their reaction to shocks. In recent weeks 
market tensions appear to have reversed, with the exception of the foreign exchange markets. 
The realisation that the slowdown in global activity is a milder process than anticipated under 
the harshest scenarios, the support by the monetary authorities and the interruption in the 
downtrend of oil prices are all factors which, so far, are offering some solace to investors. 
Growth in the world economy fell by 0.3 pp in 2015 to 3.1%, once again below expectations 
at the start of the year. This slowdown was due to the weakness of the emerging economies, 
although the advanced economies were only capable of stabilising their growth at slightly 
below 2%. These developments were reflected in further downward revisions of expected 
growth for 2016, in the advanced and emerging economies alike (Chart 1.2). In the case of 
the advanced economies, the revisions reflect a degree of sluggishness in growth in the past 
two quarters. Inflation in these economies has continued to run at very low rates, weighed 
down by the fall in commodities prices, while the indicators of medium- and long-term 
inflation expectations have continued to post further declines (Chart 1.3). 
One of the key factors behind developments on financial markets was the oil price, which 
continued falling in the opening months of the year but subsequently rose to over $40 per 
barrel. The decline in recent quarters is on account of the change in strategy by Saudi Arabia, 
the forceful pace of production of US shale oil and, following the lifting of international 
sanctions, the expectations of an increase in Iranian production. And a further contributing 
factor is the successive downward revisions in the demand for oil. The downward impact this 
1.1  External environment 
of the euro area
The international environment 
in which financial institutions 
are operating is somewhat 
uncertain
The outlook for the world 
economy has worsened…
...in a setting marked by the 
fall in oil prices 
SOURCES: Datastream, Bloomberg and Banco de España.
a Implied volatility US Treasury debt.
b Implied volatility in respect of US dollar against the euro, pound sterling, Mexican peso, Brazilian real and Chinese yuan.
c A similar indicator is calculated for Spain in Chapter 2, for a detailed explanation of this indicaror, see Box 1.1 in the May 2013 FSR.
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prompted on financial markets may have been due to the adverse effects caused for oil-
exporting countries and the energy companies, likewise affecting medium-term inflation 
expectations in the advanced countries. However, in recent weeks this trend has been 
curtailed, owing to rumours of a possible agreement within OPEC and the possibility that US 
output might be beginning to feel the effects of such low prices. 
The persistence over time of very modest growth rates in the advanced economies is a 
warning sign of a possible reduction in the potential growth of these economies, as estimates 
by the main international organisations suggest. Against this backdrop, the monetary policy 
stance has continued to be most accommodating, even bearing in mind the rise in official 
rates by the Federal Reserve in December. In several economies, central banks have continued 
to ease their monetary policy stance or, in some cases, such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States itself, the cycle of interest rate rises has been postponed. In this respect, more 
and more central banks have opted to apply negative interest rates to banks’ excess reserves, 
the latest being the Bank of Japan. In any event, in an environment of low growth, low inflation 
and low equilibrium interest rates, there are increasingly greater doubts over the headroom 
available for monetary policies alone. 
In the case of the emerging economies, the focus has remained fixed on China’s economic 
situation. The most likely scenario is still one of a gradual slowdown during the transition to 
a growth model led more by domestic demand and services sector activity. However, the risk 
of a more severe slowdown has been highlighted by the tensions in its financial markets, 
which reflect the difficulties of managing the external liberalisation process set against 
changes in the direction of international financial flows and high foreign exchange volatility. 
The situation of the Chinese economy poses additional risks to many emerging economies, 
both in Asia and in Latin America, with increased pressures on the exchange rates of the 
countries most affected. In Brazil, the recession is proving more acute and longer-lasting than 
expected; moreover, the political situation is making the expected fiscal adjustment more 
difficult, which led in February this year to the loss of the country’s investment-grade rating. 
Mexico, meanwhile, maintained growth of around 2.5%, although it saw a most marked 
downturn in its market indicators, which may be associated with the fall in oil prices. The 
depreciation of exchange rates in the region is already beginning to be felt incipiently in the 
external rebalancing of these economies; yet so far the greatest impact is being felt in a rise 
in inflation, which is making for a generalised tightening of monetary policies. 
Doubts persist over the 
potential growth of the 
advanced economies and the 
monetary policy headroom 
available
Doubts remain in the emerging 
economies over the transition 
of the Chinese economy…
…with significant 
consequences in other areas 
such as Latin America, 
additionally affected by the 
commodities cycle 
2016 CONSENSUS GROWTH FORECASTS FOR ADVANCED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES CHART 1.2
SOURCE: Consensus Forecasts.
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Pressures on exchange rates combined with fiscal difficulties in the oil-exporting countries 
saw a reduction in their international reserves and sales of assets from their sovereign funds. 
The sizeable flows of funds might be affecting financial markets and could account, to some 
extent, for the corrections observed in certain market segments and the volatility in foreign 
exchange markets (Chart 1.1.A). 
The corrections on financial markets affected the riskiest segments with greater intensity, 
although they might also have been influenced by the progressive worsening witnessed in 
the liquidity of fixed-income markets (see top panels of Chart 1.4). That would explain 
movements of greater intensity and also greater cross-market contagion. 
With a view to the coming months, several of the factors mentioned, such as doubts about 
growth in the developed economies, their inflation expectations or the re-balancing of the 
Chinese economy, may continue influencing developments on financial markets and creating 
a greater degree of uncertainty that may ultimately affect financing conditions. Monetary 
policies have been further loosened, although investors appear to be paying some heed to 
certain possible undesired consequences of specific measures. Furthermore, the effect of 
geopolitical risks, such as the referendum in the United Kingdom on this country remaining in 
the EU or election results in several advanced economies, may be an additional source of 
uncertainty which, given the nature of these risks, makes it particularly difficult for investors 
to make an assessment and might cause a sharp downturn in markets. In this connection, it 
should be highlighted that foreign exchange markets are usually more sensitive to these types 
of events, as can be seen in the recent behaviour of sterling (see bottom panels of Chart 1.4). 
Against this background, there 
have been major changes in 
capital flows that may have 
influenced financial markets…
…prompting movements that 
may have been amplified by a 
lesser degree of liquidity in 
certain markets 
Various factors that may be 
conditioning the future 
situation of financial markets 
remain in place, such as the 
UK referendum
SOURCES: Bloomberg and Markit.
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The episode of financial instability observed on international markets from December 2015 to 
February 2016 affected the euro area to a greater extent than other advanced economies, 
reflecting, among other factors, the greater vulnerability of the euro area economies, which 
have still to overcome some of the after-effects of the crisis. The correction in prices was 
particularly marked in the case of both equity and bond securities issued by banks, in 
response to various factors. First, the sensitivity of the prices of these assets to the business 
cycle is greater than that of most sectors given that, as a comparatively highly leveraged 
industry is involved, the impact of changes in the macroeconomic setting on credit institutions’ 
financial position is relatively higher. Further, this disturbance has come about in a context in 
which the European banking sector evidences low levels of profitability and faces the 
challenge of increasing such levels in a rather unpropitious situation given the weak growth 
outlook for intermediation activity, the high levels of NPLs in certain jurisdictions and the 
pressure on net interest income associated with the low levels of interest rates. Finally, various 
factors relating to European financial regulations have generated doubts and uncertainty 
among investors, affecting – especially in the opening weeks of this year – the prices of assets 
issued by this sector and, in particular, those of relatively new instruments such as CoCos 
(contingent convertible bonds).1
1.2  Financial markets 
in the euro area 
and in Spain
The episode of international 
financial instability affected 
euro area markets to a greater 
extent than other advanced 
economies and the correction 
of prices was sharper in the 
case of bank securities
1  The following chapter of this Report analyses bank stock market values in greater detail and their main determinants.
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Datastream, Barclays Live, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Markit and Banco de España.
a CoCos: yield to maturity based on IBOXX indexes. Senior CDS: senior CDS 5Y premiun average in USD for several banks (Barclays, Banco Santander, BBVA, 
Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Intesa SanPaolo, Société Générale, UBS and Unicredit). US bank stocks: S&P 500 banking sector.
b Market liquidity proxied by composite indices for US government and corporate bonds that draw together the information on 17 individual indicators (see the 
article by Broto and Lamas (2016) published in The Spanish Review of Financial Economics 14, pp. 15-22).
c? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
the market expects the euro or US dollar to appreciate against pound sterling.
d Expected volatility for the next three months based on exchange rate options. Annualised volatility data.
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Since mid-February a better climate has been discernible in EU markets. Contributing to 
this have been the stabilising of investors’ perceptions of global economic growth prospects, 
the new monetary stimulus measures implemented by the Eurosystem and the clarification 
of doubts that had arisen in relation to certain regulatory aspects. Hence, in early April, the 
prices of risk-bearing assets had recouped a portion of the losses observed at the start of 
the year, and the implied volatilities of stock market indices stood close to their historical 
average values (Chart 1.7). The Spanish 10-year government bond yield spread over the 
German benchmark, which rose to 160 bp as at mid-February, stood at end-April below 
130 bp, while its yield was around 1.6%, some 10 bp down on the level observed at the 
cut-off date for the previous FSR (Chart 1.6). 
The habitual indicators used to assess to what extent share prices are aligned with their past 
relationship to other magnitudes do not evidence signs of overpricing for the market average, 
either in Spain or in the euro area as a whole (Chart 1.7). The share prices of Spanish 
companies are thus equivalent, on average, to 1.3 times their book value, below their historical 
average (1.7 times since January 2002), and the cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio 
stands at below 12, compared with an average of 14 over the past 10 years. The risk premia 
on public and private bonds currently stand at above their historical averages. 
Despite the fact there are no signs of excessive market pricing, the experience of the recent 
bout of instability illustrates the high sensitivity of share prices to changes in investor 
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sentiment. In this connection, the uncertainty surrounding the international macroeconomic 
outlook is a major factor of risk for the course of prices on international and domestic 
financial markets. Any future worsening in this respect might affect financial stability in Spain 
both through the tightening of financing conditions for the different sectors, which would 
have an adverse impact on economic growth and on the quality of bank assets, and through 
financial intermediaries’ portfolio losses. 
Euro area GDP showed moderate quarter-on-quarter increases of 0.3% both in Q3 and in Q4 
last year (Chart 1.8). Inflation continued to stand at virtually zero [with year-on-year rates of 
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) of 0% in March this year], having held at 
this level since late 2014, and largely influenced by developments in energy goods prices. 
Similarly, core inflation, which excludes unprocessed food and energy, stood at a moderate 
rate (1% in March this year), virtually unchanged on six months earlier. 
The latest forecasts published by the ECB (in March 2016) point to modest growth in euro 
area economic activity over the next two years, with annual average increases in real GDP 
of 1.4% in 2016, and of 1.7% in 2017 (Chart 1.8). With respect to the projections six 
months earlier, this entails a downward revision of 0.3 pp and 0.1 pp, respectively, 
prompted by the somewhat more negative global growth scenario, the recent appreciation 
of the effective exchange rate of the euro and the greater uncertainty reflected in financial 
market tensions. On the prices front, the fresh decline in oil prices has led to the projected 
increase in the euro area HICP being set at only 0.1% in 2016, and 1.3% in 2017, setting 
back further the horizon of a return of inflation rates to the ECB target of levels below but 
close to 2%. 
The risks surrounding this baseline scenario remain tilted to the downside. As regards activity, 
the biggest risk remains possibly more negative economic developments at the global level, 
linked to a greater-than-expected downturn in the emerging economies. Another source of 
risk for the international environment is that stemming from the aforementioned increase in 
geopolitical tensions. With regard to prices, the extension of the scenario of expected low 
inflation rates raises the risks of potential negative, second-round effects on the growth of 
nominal income, with the subsequent adverse impact on the process of deleveraging still to 
be seen through in some economies. 
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a The dotted lines represent the historical averages of the series. From 2.1.2000 for implied volatilities and from 2.1.2005 for the cyclically adjusted PER.
b The cyclically adjusted PER is calculated as the ratio of share price to 10-years moving average of earnings.
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Against this backdrop, the ECB Governing Council meetings in December 2015 and March 
2016 agreed to additional monetary stimuli implemented through a broad range of measures 
which include the following: a fresh cut in interest rates, placing the deposit facility rate at 
–0.40% (20 bp below the levels prior to the December Governing Council meeting); an 
expansion in the volume of asset purchases to €80 billion per month (€20 billion more than 
previously), and their extension to high-quality bonds issued by non-financial corporations; 
the prolongation of purchases at least until March 2017; and the introduction of new 
targeted long-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II) with a maturity of four years.
In these new operations, which will be conducted quarterly between June 2016 and March 
2017 and will have a maturity of four years, institutions will be entitled to borrow up to 30% 
of the stock of their eligible loans as at 31 January 2016, less any amount outstanding that 
was borrowed in the first two TLTROs. The interest rate under TLTRO II will be fixed at the 
rate applied in the main refinancing operations prevailing at the time of take-up, and a rate 
reduction is envisaged over the life of the operation. This will depend on the net change in 
eligible lending between 1 February 2016 and 31 January 2018 with respect to the 
institutions’ benchmark which may even position the interest rate on the operation at the 
rate of the deposit facility applicable at the time of take-up, thereby contributing to a further 
reduction in the cost of financing for corporations.
In the Spanish economy, as was expected, GDP recorded a slight slowdown in the second 
half of 2015 – posting quarter-on-quarter growth rates of 0.8% in Q3 and in Q4, compared 
with 0.9% and 1% in Q1 and Q2, respectively (Chart 1.8) – which is estimated to have 
continued in 2016 Q1. Accordingly, for 2015 as a whole, GDP growth was 3.2%. On the 
latest Banco de España forecasts (corresponding to March this year), the expansion in the 
Spanish economy is expected to hold this year and next, albeit tending towards more 
moderate rates than recorded last year, at 2.7% in 2016 and 2.3% in 2017. 
Consumer prices are expected to have continued to be greatly influenced by fluctuations 
on the energy goods markets. The year-on-year rate of the CPI ended 2015 at 0%, but fell 
subsequently to –0.8% in February and March this year. The forecasts available in early 
April anticipated a recovery, which would lead prices to fall by 0.1% on average in 2016, 
rising subsequently to 1.6% in 2017. 
In the housing market there were slight increases both in activity and in prices in 2015. Taking 
end-year data, INE reported year-on-year growth in prices of 4.2%, up from 1.8% in 2014. 
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Households and non-financial corporations made notable progress in correcting their debt, 
with declines both in the debt/GDP and debt burden ratios. The decline in the former was 
boosted, on this occasion, not only by negative financing flows, which are progressively 
more moderate, but also by growth in nominal income. In the case of the latter, a contributing 
factor was the reduction in interest rates on outstanding credit. As a result, the debt ratios 
of both sectors are expected to have continued on their declining path, drawing gradually 
closer to average euro area values (as at December 2015, the latest figure available, they 
were both 7-8 pp above this average – see Chart 1.9). 
Public sector debt is estimated to have stabilised at a level marginally below 100% of GDP 
at end-2015, albeit with still-high deficit levels. In this respect, the deviation from the 2015 
target of almost 1 pp of GDP adds a degree of uncertainty as regards the possibility of 
additional budgetary consolidation measures. 
The net international investment position showed a slight improvement (lower net liabilities) 
of 6 pp in 2015, posting a debit balance equivalent to 90% of GDP in December last year. 
This improvement is somewhat more marked (8 pp) if inter-central bank positions in the 
Eurosystem are excluded. In any event, the still-high debtor positions of the public and 
private sectors and, consequently, of the nation as a whole, are a factor of vulnerability 
ahead of any possible tightening of financial conditions in Spain, meaning the drive to 
correct such positions must persist. 
Overall, the balance of risks surrounding the baseline scenario for the Spanish economy is 
estimated to have worsened since the publication of the previous FSR. Risks stemming from 
the external sector largely match those indicated for the euro area and relate to the uncertainty 
over global economic growth, linked especially to developments in certain emerging 
economies, and also to the recent heightening of geopolitical risks in some regions. 
In the domestic arena, the possible prolongation over time of the current situation of political 
uncertainty adds certain doubts about the future course of economic policies and might 
ultimately affect agents’ consumption and investment decisions adversely. On the fiscal 
front, the deviation of the deficit in 2015 in respect of budget plans highlights the need to 
give priority to seeing though fiscal consolidation. The adoption of additional budgetary 
measures might alter the growth profile of output, entailing costs in the short run and 
generating benefits, in terms of the related gains in confidence, which would only be fully 
visible once some time had elapsed.
Major correction in the debt of 
households and non-financial 
corporations 
The upward deviation from the 
budget deficit target in 2015 
adds a degree of uncertainty 
as regards the possibility of 
additional budgetary 
consolidation measures
Risks to economic activity 
have increased, as a result 
both of uncertainty over global 
economic growth…
…and that associated with the 
course of domestic economic 
policies
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
HOUSEHOLD DEBT. SPAIN CORPORATE DEBT. SPAIN
HOUSEHOLD DEBT. EURO AREA CORPORATE DEBT. EURO AREA
A  PRIVATE INDEBTEDNESS RATIOS
% GDP
MACROFINANCIAL IMBALANCES IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY CHART 1.9
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
SPAIN EURO AREA
B  PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS RATIO
% GDP
SOURCE: Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MAY 2016
2 BANKING RISKS, PROFITABILITY AND SOLVENCY
International exposure
This section of the FSR analyses the evolution of the total assets of Spanish deposit 
institutions and specifically, their international exposure which, given the vulnerabilities 
identified in the previous chapter, may involve a risk for the investments made by Spanish 
institutions abroad, cushioned by the geographical diversification of such exposures. 
Subsequent sections analyse the risk arising from domestic exposures, the risk that the 
low interest rate environment poses to the profit generation capacity and, finally, the ability 
to withstand the risks analysed, by studying the solvency of Spanish deposit institutions.
The consolidated total assets of Spanish deposit institutions amounted to €3,666 billion in 
December 2015, including both their business in Spain and that of their subsidiaries and 
branches abroad. They thus grew by 2.5% year-on-year (see Annex 1),1 continuing the 
upward trend initiated in previous periods (see Chart 2.1).
Since 2008 the percentage of financial assets abroad has grown continuously relative to 
those in Spain, practically doubling to 45% of total financial assets in December 2015 (as 
against 25% in 2008).
Analysing the developments in 2015 of the main components of activity abroad, the growth 
in loans (which have increased by around 20% since 2014) was notable, as was, to a 
lesser extent, the increase in debt securities (which have grown by 10%).
With respect to the type of business, Chart 2.2.A shows that three quarters of the financial 
assets on the balance sheet of Spanish institutions arising from abroad are loans, while 
15% correspond to debt securities, 8% to derivatives and the rest to equity instruments. 
1  Data from FINREP statements are used in the FSR for the first time. Among other changes, international activity 
can only be broken down in the case of financial assets (derivatives, equity instruments, debt securities and 
loans), which represent 87% of the total balance sheet in 2015.
2.1 Banking risks
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Regarding the loan portfolio, half of the loans correspond to loans to households (two 
thirds of which are mortgages) and 31% to loans to non-financial corporations (a third of 
which are to SMEs), while notable among the rest are the 8% corresponding to credit 
institutions. Chart 2.2.B summarises the composition of the loan portfolio described above 
and Chart 2.2.C shows the change in the most important components of this portfolio 
relative to 2014, the growth in loans to SMEs at the international level (50%) being notable. 
Spanish banks have adopted a retail business model for their growth outside Spain, 
exploiting their competitive advantage while steering clear of wholesale activity with its 
higher volatility and fierce competition from large European and US banks.
The geographical distribution of the international exposure is another element to consider 
when gauging the risk of the international activity of Spanish banks (see Chart 2.2.D). 
Practically half of the international exposure is concentrated in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, almost 9% is located in Mexico, 8% in Brazil and 6% in Turkey. Along with this, 
Chart 2.3 shows the rate of growth of the international loan portfolio between 2014 and 2015, 
and the evolution of the exchange rate of the currency of each country other than the euro. In 
particular, the euro fell by 5.8% against the pound sterling and by 10.3% against the US 
dollar, while the lending exposure in these currencies increased in 2015 by more than 20%.2 
2  A considerable part of the increase in the exposure to the United Kingdom stems from the acquisition of a British 
bank by a Spanish deposit institution. If this corporate transaction is not taken into account, the increase in the 
exposure to the United Kingdom would have been 10%.
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By contrast, the euro appreciated in 2015 against the Latin American currencies in whose 
countries the presence of Spanish banks is most important (the Mexican peso and Brazilian 
real), having mixed results in terms of credit exposure. Thus, while against the peso, the euro 
rose by 6%, the volume of credit of Spanish institutions in that country grew by 12%, i.e. the 
growth in credit more than offset the exchange rate effect. The opposite is the case in Brazil, 
where the appreciation of the euro against the real (33%) was accompanied by a fall in the 
exposure in 2015 (–14%).3 
In any case, it should not be forgotten that the activity of Spanish institutions abroad is 
carried out under financial autonomy criteria and, in the main, consists of local activity in 
local currency, which largely mitigates the risks arising from such activity.
With regard to the financing received by general government, its weight in the balance 
sheet has fallen by 1 pp (from 15.2% in 2014 to 14.2% in 2015, see Annex 1). This decline 
corresponded to the increase in private sector financing (which includes credit and debt 
securities), the weight of which in the balance sheet increases by 1.5 pp (from 58.3% in 
2014 to 59.8% in 2015).
From the perspective of credit risk, total non-performing loans (NPLs) decreased in 
December 2015 by 14.2%, their weight in total assets falling from 5.3% in December 2014 
to 4.5% a year later. In December 2015, the NPL ratios associated with total lending in 
those countries in which Spanish banks have a large exposure fell, to stand in the case of 
the United Kingdom and the United States at around 1.5%. In Brazil, Turkey and France, 
the NPL ratio increased, albeit by less than 1 pp (see Chart 2.4.A). 
The NPL ratio for loans at consolidated level of Spanish deposit institutions declined in 
2015 to 6.3% (from 8% in December 2014). In the case of loans to the private sector, the 
NPL ratio fell from 8.8% in 2014 to 7.1% in 2015.
At the European level, data published by the European Banking Authority (EBA) relating to 
June 2015, obtained from the transparency exercise, show significant cross-country 
3  The growth in the exposure to Turkey stems from the increase in the holding in the capital of a Turkish bank by a 
Spanish deposit institution.
The volume of non-performing 
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in the loan portfolio
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The growth rate of the Turkish loan portfolio between 2014 and 2015 was 295%.
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dispersion in the NPL ratio of the loan portfolio (which ranges from 1% in Sweden to 50% 
in Cyprus, see Chart 2.4.B). In Spain, the NPL ratio for the aggregate loan portfolio of the 
main Spanish deposit institutions stood at 7.1% (as against 5.6% at the European level).
Domestic exposure
Following the line of analysis discussed at the beginning of Chapter 2, using data from the 
individual financial statements it is possible to analyse developments in lending in Spain 
and, therefore, the risks arising from domestic exposures. In December 2015, the latest 
period for which data are available, lending to the resident private sector in Spain fell by 
4.1% year-on-year, as against a decline of 6.4% in December 2014. Although the year-on-
year rate of change remains negative, the slowdown in this fall in lending, which began in 
mid-2013, continued (see Chart 2.5.A). The improvement was seen at all institutions, 
although the variability between institutions has increased (see Chart 2.5.B). The latest 
monthly data, for January 2016, point to a continuation of this trend slowdown in the 
decline of lending (–3.8% year-on-year).
The quarterly data for December 2015 enable lending to be analysed by institutional sector 
and by industry. Lending to households declined by 4.2% in December 2015 year-on-year, 
its rate of decline having slowed slightly over the year (–4.8% in December 2014). Lending 
to non-financial corporations also declined by 4.2% in December 2015, recovering from a 
much sharper decline a year earlier (–7% in December 2014). 
Lending to the resident private 
sector, in the case of business 
in Spain, continued to fall, 
albeit at more moderate 
rates…
…both for households and 
non-financial corporations
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As regards lending to households, lending for house purchase and lending for other 
purposes behaved differently. In the first case, the decline in the year-on-year rate of 
change intensified from 4.1% in December 2014 to 4.8% in December 2015. Meanwhile, 
lending to households for other purposes declined by 0.8% year-on-year in December 
2015, as against a much sharper fall, of 9%, a year earlier (see Chart 2.5.A). 
By industry, the decline in lending for construction and real estate activities was still 10.4% 
in December 2015, as against a fall of 15.6% a year earlier. Meanwhile, lending to non-
financial corporations for other purposes declined much more moderately, by 0.9% in 
December 2015, which amounted to continuation along the path of moderating contraction 
observed in previous quarters, as compared with the decline in December 2014 of 1.6%. 
The greater stability of lending for purposes other than construction and real estate 
activities was broad based across industries. There was a notable moderation of the 
decline in lending to services other than real estate activities, which fell by 1.2% in 
December 2015, as compared with a decline of 4.7% in December 2014 (see Chart 2.5.C).
Both loans for house purchase 
and, to a lesser extent, 
consumer credit continue to 
decline 
For firms, the moderation in 
the decline in lending was 
broad based across sectors …
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Includes securitisations.
b The graph shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the year-on-year rate of change of credit for deposit institutions. This density function 
is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous and smoothed graphical 
representation of that function.
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Lending to SMEs represents, in December 2015, 22% of total lending to the resident 
private sector, this percentage remaining unchanged from a year earlier. Of the total lending 
to non-financial corporations, SMEs account for 52%, up 1 pp from December 2014. 
Lending to SMEs declined by 2.8% year-on-year in December 2015 (see Chart 2.6.A), a 
significantly lower rate of decline than that observed for lending to large firms (–6.4%). 
Within lending to SMEs, the behaviour of industries other than construction and real estate 
activities was more buoyant, with growth in lending of 1.8%, as against a decline of 9% in 
lending to construction and real estate activities (see Chart 2.6.B). It should be noted that 
in the case of SMEs, lending to these activities accounts for 40% of all lending to SMEs in 
December 2015, as against 25% in the case of other firms (see Charts 2.6.C and D). Box 
2.1 provides a complementary perspective, based on the situation of the credit cycle in 
Spain, using a methodology that assesses the credit cycle position.
Chart 2.7.A shows the behaviour, over a long time period, of new mortgage loans for house 
purchase. This chart plots the volume of new credit (annual flow) and the volume of total 
mortgage credit (stock at December each year), both with base 100 in the first year for 
which information is available (2002), and the flow of mortgage credit as a percentage of 
the stock. In 2014 and, especially, 2015 this flow displayed an incipient recovery. The 
percentage of new mortgage loans for house purchase reached 3.8% of the total volume 
of mortgage credit in 2015, up from 3.2% in 2014.
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The approval rate of the loans which non-financial corporations request from banks with 
which they are not working or with which they have not had a credit relationship in the 
preceding few months fell slightly last year, from 37% in the last few months of 2014 to 34% 
in the latter months of 2015. These rates are well below those seen during the period of 
strong lending growth leading up to 2007, and those of the period of prolonged and significant 
contraction in economic and lending activity observed since then. However, the year-on-
year rate of change in applications has continued to slow, to below 5% in December 2015.
…while the approval rates for 
lending to non-financial 
corporations declined slightly 
last year 
As explained in Chapter 3, one of the aims of macroprudential 
policy is to smooth financial cycles, strengthening the solvency of 
the banking system in the upswing in the cycle to subsequently 
allow the release of the accumulated buffers in the downturn. To 
properly pursue this aim, it is vital to have a precise measurement 
of the financial cycle. Financial series are generally noisy. Mixed up 
in them are business cycles, which in many cases last several 
years, with shorter-dated oscillations due to transitory situations. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to strip out the short-term effects so 
that the estimation of the cycle is not tainted by a short-lived shock. 
The academic literature has proposed various techniques for 
extracting the business cycle from these series. One of the most 
established techniques was proposed in a BIS paper.1 Using a 
band-pass filter,2 it is possible using econometric procedures to 
decompose economic series into different frequencies, and to 
retain those of interest. Specifically, the BIS methodology assumes 
that relevant cycles last 8-30 years. In terms of construction, the 
cycles are oscillations around a horizontal axis, since the trend 
component of the series is eliminated. 
Chart A shows the result of applying this methodology to year-on-
year rates of change in Spanish credit and in GDP, expressed in 
real terms. It can be seen in the panel that the credit variable 
shows oscillations on a greater scale than the GDP variable. 
Further, a complete cycle has an approximate duration of over 15 
years in both cases, although the GDP cycle usually leads the 
credit cycle. Chart B shows the position in the cycle of these two 
variables at two specific dates using a stylised cycle. In it, four 
differentiated phases can be observed: (1) level below the historical 
average and moving away from it; (2) level below the average, but 
drawing closer to it; (3) level above the average and quickening; 
and (4) level above the average and diminishing. In mid-2012, at 
one of the worst junctures in the recent crisis, both series could be 
seen to be at their trough (moving from phase 1 to 2). At present, 
the position in the cycle of credit is still in the second phase, 
though now much closer to the historical average. However, GDP 
is in the mid-zone of phase 3, in step with the economic growth 
since late 2014. 
CALCULATION OF THE POSITION IN THE CYCLE OF VARIOUS MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS BOX 2.1
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Stylised cycle, where the peak and trough correspond to the actual highest and lowest values of the cycle in each series. The cycle is shown stylised over four 
phases: (1) growth below and moving away from trend, (2) growth below but moving towards trend, (3) growth above and moving away from trend, and (4) 
growth above but moving towards trend.
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1  Characterising the financial cycle: don’t lose sight of the medium term! 
M. Drehmann, C. Borio and K. Tsatsaronis. BIS Working Paper No. 380. 
June 2012.
2  The band pass filter. L. J. Christiano and T. J. Fitzgerald. International 
Economic Review, Volume 44, No. 2, pp. 435-465. May 2003.
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In the second half of 2015 interest rates on new loans by Spanish deposit institutions 
continued on the moderate downward path initiated in 2014, reflecting a relative 
improvement in credit conditions available to households and non-financial corporations 
(see Chart 2.7.B). The difference between the interest rates charged to non-financial 
corporations on new loans, depending on the size of the loan, continued to decline, owing 
to the larger reduction in rates on smaller loans.
As regards the explicit manifestation of credit risk, the non-performing loans to the resident 
private sector in business in Spain continued to decline in 2015. They fell that year by more 
than €37 billion, so that not only did the decline continue but so too did its acceleration, 
since the decline in 2014 was €24 billion. The month-on-month change in such non-
performing loans has extended the downward trend that began in early 2014. As a result, 
in December 2015 the total non-performing loans of all deposit institutions were 22.3% 
lower than in the same month of the previous year (see Chart 2.8.A), due to the economic 
growth and low interest rates.
The downward trend in non-performing loans was observed both in lending to households 
and in that to non-financial corporations. In the first case, non-performing loans declined 
by 21.4% in 2015, as against a decline of 7% year-on-year in December 2014. In the case 
of non-financial corporations, the fall in 2015 was 22.7%, as against a decrease of 14.3% 
the previous year. 
Within lending to households, non-performing loans fell both for lending for house purchase 
(22% year-on-year in December 2015) and for other purposes (19.7%). In both cases, 
moreover, the rate of fall increased during 2015 (up from 5.2% and 11.9%, respectively, in 
December 2014). Likewise, for non-financial corporations, the fall in non-performing loans 
extended to all sectors, the rate of decline having accelerated both for credit to construction 
and real estate activities (28.7% year-on-year) and for other lending (14.7%, see Chart 
2.8.B). The significant and on-going decline in non-performing loans in 2015 was broad-
based across institutions (see Chart 2.8.C).
Non-performing loans to the 
resident private sector in 
business in Spain continued to 
fall in 2015, with an increase in 
the rate of decline…
... both for households and 
corporations 
For households and non-
financial corporations, the 
improvement in non-
performing loans extended to 
all loan types…
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The volume of new transactions in 2014 relates to the twelve-month period from April 2014 to March 2015, since the 2014 data are not available from January. 
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The reduction in non-performing loans was seen in all size categories of borrower firm. The 
most important declines occurred among SMEs, with a year-on-year rate of change of 
–24% in December 2015. Large firms recorded a fall of 21.4% and sole proprietors 18.2% 
(see Chart 2.8.D). In the case of SMEs, the sector that recorded the most significant decline 
in non-performing loans was construction and real estate activities (year-on-year fall of 
28.7% in December 2015). Other sectors recorded an aggregate decline of 16%. In both 
cases the rate of decline of non-performing loans continues to accelerate.
As regards the flow of new non-performing loans, in the resident private sector (non-financial 
corporations and households) it was 37.7% lower in December 2015 than a year earlier. This 
decline occurred both for non-financial corporations (–35%) and for households (–43.8%, 
see Chart 2.9.A). These decreases in flows of new non-performing loans have been observed 
both for large corporations and SMEs, although these series display significant volatility (see 
Chart 2.9.B). Between June and December 2015 the flow of new non-performing loans 
amounted to €17.8 billion, while written-off non-performing loans totalled €12.4 billion and 
recoveries exceeded €19.8 billion. In comparison with the second half of 2014 the flow of 
new non-performing loans was smaller (12.3% of the initial volume of non-performing loans, 
…and, in the case of 
corporations, also to all size 
categories
In the second half of 2015 
there was a smaller flow of 
new non-performing loans, 
and also a lower volume of 
recoveries with respect to a 
year earlier
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The transfers to Sareb by Group 1 and Group 2 banks in December 2012 and February 2013 affect the rates of change in those periods.
b The graph shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the year-on-year rate of change of credit for Spanish deposit institutions. This density function 
is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous and smoothed graphical 
representation of that function.
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as against 15.5%). The level of write-offs hardly changed between these two periods, 
although the percentage was slightly higher in 2015 (see Chart 2.9.C and D).
The NPL ratio of the resident private sector in Spain continued to decline, as a result of the 
clear downward trend in non-performing loans and the (more moderate) fall in outstanding 
credit. The ratio fell to 10.4% in December 2015, from 12.8% in the same month of the 
previous year (see Chart 2.10.A).
By institutional sector, the NPL ratios of both households and non-financial corporations 
decreased. In the case of households, the ratio fell to 5.4% in December 2015 (down 1.2 
pp from December 2014), and in the case of non-financial corporations to 17.3% (from 
21.4% in December 2014). By type of loan, in the case of households, the NPL ratio for 
loans for house purchase fell to 4.7%, while the ratio for other loans fell to 9.6%. There 
was a broad-based improvement in the NPL ratios of the various business sectors. In 
particular, the ratio for construction and real estate activities fell to 28.3%, down 7 pp from 
a year earlier. The NPL ratio for other credit to financial corporations also behaved 
favourably, falling from 14% in December 2014 to 12.1% a year later (see Chart 2.10.B). 
By firm size, the NPL ratio fell for SMEs to 21.3 % (from 27.3 % in December 2014) and for 
large firms to 13.7 % (from 16.3% a year earlier).
The private sector NPL ratio 
continued to decline…
…and did so across all 
institutional sectors, loan 
types and firm size categories
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Shown beside each bar is the percentage each item represents of the total NPLs at the beginning of the period. NPLs recovered include both non-performing 
loans that become performing again and foreclosed assets.
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Another metric related to banks’ non-performing loans is the so-called Texas ratio.4 Chart 
2.11 depicts the ratio over the last few years, showing that it was rising until end-2013 
(apart from the fall in December 2012, as a result of the transfer of assets to Sareb from 
the Group 1 institutions), and has declined progressively thereafter. In short, it behaved 
similarly to the NPL ratio, confirming the gradual improvement in the quality of the assets 
and their coverage on the balance sheets of Spanish deposit institutions.
The foreclosed assets, or assets received in payment of debts arising from business in 
Spain, held by Spanish banks on their balance sheets increased by 0.95% in 2015, to 
slightly more than €84 billion. The amount of foreclosed assets has remained steady since 
4  The purpose of this variable is to identify those banks whose solvency may be affected by their problem assets 
(non-performing loans and foreclosed assets). It takes its name from the fact that it was first applied to banks in 
the state of Texas at the beginning of the 1980s. The ratio is calculated by dividing the value of the problem 
assets (non-performing loans and foreclosed assets) of a bank by the sum of its accounting capital and 
provisions. Ratios of more than one indicate more problematic situations with a higher risk of insolvency, since 
unproductive assets are less covered.
The Texas ratio behaved in a 
similar way to the NPL ratio 
Foreclosed assets increased 
slightly in 2015 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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December 2012, within the range of €75 billion to €84 billion, as seen in Chart 2.12.A. 
Chart 2.12.B breaks down the total volume of foreclosed assets by type of asset. 37.6% 
of the total is land, the weight of which fell by almost 0.5 pp in 2015. 25% are completed 
buildings (down 0.43 pp in 2015) and 22.3% are foreclosed assets arising from house 
purchases (up 1.8 pp from December 2014). Finally, buildings under construction amounted 
in December 2015 to 5% of the total, this percentage having remained unchanged in 2015.
Adding together non-performing loans and foreclosed assets produces a total of €213 
billion of unproductive assets on the balance sheet as at December 2015, which do not 
generate revenues in the income statement and have to be financed. The total of these two 
variables declined by 14.5% in 2015, but they still represent a significant proportion of 
banks’ total assets in their business in Spain, putting downward pressure on their income 
statement, reducing their profit generation and, therefore, hindering any improvement in 
their solvency. 
The total forborne credit at consolidated level amounted to €205 billion in December 2015, 
which implied a year-on-year decline of 6.4% from December 2014. Of this total amount, 
51.5% related to non-financial corporations and 46.2% to households, the weight of non-
financial corporations having fallen by 3 pp during the year, while that of households rose 
by the same amount. Based on data from individual financial statements relating to 
business in Spain, the total forborne credit to the resident private sector amounted to 
€153.7 billion in December 2015, a decline of 15.3% from December 2014. This change 
represents a continuation of the decline seen throughout the available time series from 
March 2014 (see Chart 2.13.A). The decrease in forborne exposures in 2015 was apparent 
both in the case of households (10.3%) and, especially, non-financial corporations (18%). 
The weight of forborne exposures in total credit also declined last year, to 12.1% in 
December 2015, from 13.7% in the same month of the previous year (see Chart 2.13.B).
Of total forborne credit, 48.7% was non-performing in December 2015, 2.4 pp less than in 
December 2014. Also, the proportion of total forborne credit classified as substandard fell, 
from 18% in December 2014 to 16% a year later. As a result, the proportion of total 
forborne credit classified as standard increased in 2015 by 4.4 pp, to 35.3% in December 
2015 (see Chart 2.13.B).
To sum up, in 2015 ex-post credit risk in its various manifestations (non-performing loans, 
forborne exposures, foreclosed assets, in the form of stocks and flows, and different 
In total, unproductive assets 
declined by 14.5% in 2015, 
although they still represent a 
significant proportion of the 
assets
Forborne credit declined at 
consolidated level. On data for 
business in Spain, a reduction 
was also observed, continuing 
the trend of 2014
To sum up, NPLs are falling 
and there is an incipient...
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combinations of ratios of these variables) improved significantly for deposit institutions in their 
domestic business. Sustained growth in economic activity lies behind these positive 
developments. At the same time, there was a revival in lending, which was still incipient in the 
case of SMEs (excluding those in property development and construction), the firms that have 
most difficulty accessing sources of funding other than bank finance; this is also a positive sign 
that comes in addition to the behaviour of NPLs mentioned above. The materialisation of some 
of the risks to economic growth discussed in Chapter 1 could jeopardise these developments. 
As discussed in Chapter 1 and as a consequence of the risks identified, uncertainty has 
increased on financial markets worldwide. This growing uncertainty has been reflected in 
the systemic risk indicator (SRI) in Spain, which rose in the first two months of 2015 before 
falling back since then (see Chart 2.14.A). Volatility in market indices, especially in the 
banking sector (although also in other not essentially banking indicators such as IBEX35 
options), was the SRI component that rose most in the opening months of the year, 
reflecting a higher level of stress in the stock markets, along with a certain degree of 
tension in the bank funding and government debt markets.
There are, as explained in Chapter 1, several factors behind this increase in systemic risk; 
in addition, these factors create a feedback loop. First, global economic growth forecasts, 
which have been gradually lowered, increasing the fear of another global recession or of a 
new outbreak of the financial crisis with an impact on the real economy. Second, the likely 
continuing deceleration of the Chinese economy. Third, emerging market weakness, 
particularly in the economies most reliant on commodity exports, as the decline in 
commodity prices and currency depreciation (along with the effect of the US rate rise) is 
acting as a brake on these economies. Lastly, falling oil prices, which could have a negative 
impact on the financial situation of the exporting countries and on oil industry firms, with 
possible side effects on the banking sector through its exposure to the energy sector.
A CoVaR5 model may be used to quantify the contribution of Spanish banks to the systemic 
risk of the euro area as a whole. In 2015, the average CoVaR of Spanish banks was similar 
to the 2014 figure, although it increased slightly and was somewhat more volatile at the 
5 For an explanation of the CoVaR model, see the May 2015 FSR.
...revival in lending, although 
the macroeconomic 
uncertainty is a risk factor
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beginning of 2016 (see Chart 2.14.B). This contrasts with a marked upturn in the 5th 
percentile of CoVaR of European banks in the second half of 2015, which implies that the 
contribution of some euro area banks to systemic risk rose significantly in recent months, 
which is consistent with the market turbulence observed. To date, there is no increase of 
the same magnitude in the average contribution of Spanish banks.
As discussed in Chapter 1, in this scenario the stock market reaction intensified, especially in 
the first two months of 2016. Investor mistrust translated into progressively higher volatility 
and growing risk aversion, which ultimately led to sharp falls in stock prices and higher 
demand for traditional safe haven assets such as gold, German government bonds or the yen.
In recent months the stock market performance of the Spanish banking sector has been 
similar to that of the main European banking systems and the European banking sector 
overall. The decline that began towards the end of August intensified in the first few weeks 
of 2016 and has moderated, to a certain extent, since mid-February (see Chart 2.15.A). 
Various global factors may be considered in an attempt to explain this downward correction 
in European banking sector share prices (the performance of other international stock 
indices or oil prices), but there are, however, other factors specific to the euro area and its 
banking systems that may help to interpret this correction.
On the stock market, the 
Spanish banking sector has 
performed similarly to the 
European banking sector, with 
falls since end-August that 
intensified in early 2016 and 
have moderated since mid-
February 
SOURCES: Datastream, ECB and Banco de España.
a For a detailed explanation of this indicator, see Box 1.1 in the May 2013 FSR.
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One of the main factors specific to the euro area is the low profitability of the banking 
business in Europe. The extremely low interest rate scenario, in response to a euro area 
inflation rate that is below the ECB target, which could last for some time while inflation 
expectations warrant, is placing considerable pressure on margins at euro area banks. 
Thus, at present, return on equity (ROE) levels are in many cases below the cost of capital 
(see Box 2.2 for an analysis of the cost of capital in the main European countries), which 
makes investing in the banking sector less attractive. 
Second, there is continuing concern regarding the high NPL levels on some European 
banks’ balance sheets. This concern focuses especially on certain banking systems, some 
of which have NPL ratios over 20% in their lending to the private sector (see Chart 2.15.B).
To assess the effect that asset quality on banks’ balance sheets may have on their stock 
prices, the relationship between stock prices and a proxy for the Texas ratio, defined as 
the ratio between NPLs and the sum of loan-loss provisions and capital,6 has been 
6  The information available does not include foreclosed assets, which would be the correct definition of the Texas 
ratio.
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banking business in Europe is 
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this stock market 
performance,...
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profit, and that thereafter dividend growth will gradually converge 
towards expected long-term economic growth, until these two 
variables coincide.2 The predictions for corporate profit growth 
have been taken from the investor forecasts supplied by I/B/E/S 
(Institutional Broker’s Estimate System), while the long-term 
economic growth forecast comes from Consensus Economics. 
Using these projections it is possible to extract the implicit 
discount rate from the cash flows of the Euro Stoxx index. Second, 
the cost of capital3 of a particular bank is calculated by multiplying 
The cost of capital faced by banks may be defined as the return 
required by investors in order to be prepared to become 
shareholders. Normally, the value of a risky investment is 
calculated as the sum of the future cash flows, discounted at a 
rate that compensates for the risk involved. The cost of capital is 
precisely this rate, and it is the one included in the profitability of 
the investment.
As the cost of capital cannot be observed, there are various 
econometric approximations for calculating it.1 This box applies a 
methodology similar to the one currently used by the ECB to make 
this calculation, which has two parts. First, the cost of capital is 
calculated for the European market as a whole, on the basis of the 
Euro Stoxx index, using a two-stage dividend discount model. 
This model assumes that dividend growth will be equal to the 
profit growth estimated by investors during the initial years of the 
time horizon, with dividends accounting for a fixed proportion of 
BOX 2.2CALCULATION OF THE COST OF CAPITAL OF BANKS
analysed. As Chart 2.15.C shows, the higher the ratio (with balance sheet data as at 31 
December 2014), the greater, in general, the stock price falls between 30 June 2015 and 7 
March 2016. In this respect, a regression analysis has been made of the effect of the Texas 
ratio on changes in stock prices.7 The results show that the Texas ratio is a significant 
variable to explain the changes in stock prices of European banks and that it has the 
expected effect.
In turn, the CDSs of the major European banks replicate, in part, the stock price 
performance. In particular, CDSs rose in the opening months of 2016 while share prices 
fell, and they have declined in recent weeks as the stock market has recovered (see Chart 
2.15.D). CDSs held relatively steady throughout the second half of 2015 as share prices fell 
but more moderately.
7  A simple OLS regression analysis, taking the change in stock prices of 46 listed European banks between 30 
June 2015 and 7 March 2016.
1  See, for example, Box 5 of the ECB’s May 2015 Financial Stability 
Review and Box 1 of Issue 1/2016 of the ECB’s Economic Bulletin.
2  For further details, see “A simplified common stock valuation model”, by 
R. J. Fuller and C.C. Hsia, Financial Analysts Journal, September-
October 1984, pages 49 to 56.
3  In fact the premium is calculated, not the cost. That is to say, the spread 
over the risk-free rate, which is currently zero.
SOURCES: Datastream, Consensus Economics and Banco de España.
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beginning of 2016, the increase in volatility on the markets 
generated a rise in the cost of capital to levels of close to 8%. This 
is an approximate value that should be treated with caution, given 
all the assumptions that had to be made to reach it.5 In any case, 
it is similar to the average annual return (in real terms) that Spanish 
banks have actually provided over the last 30 years, if the recent 
crisis is excluded from the calculation, so that only complete 
cycles are considered. This cost of capital is currently higher than 
the profitability of the Spanish banking system, which recorded an 
ROE in December 2015 of 5.6%, in consolidated terms, and of 
4.4% for the purely Spanish banking business.
the discount rate of the market index by the CAPM beta for the 
bank in question.4 In order to take into account possible changes 
in the value of beta over time, this coefficient has been calculated 
using one-year moving windows, based on daily data.
Chart A shows the evolution of the cost of capital in four European 
banking systems: the Spanish, German, French and Italian ones. 
The average cost of capital has been calculated for each country, 
using Datastream banking sector indices to calculate the betas. In 
these four countries the level of the cost of capital is seen to be 
relatively stable between 2000 and 2007, with limited cross-
country differences. After the start of the crisis, differences begin 
to be observed, which become more pronounced from the 
outbreak of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. The last few 
months of 2015 saw falls in the cost of capital, and a mid-position 
in the European comparison for the cost of capital of Spanish 
banks, which had declined to 6.8% by year-end. However, at the 
BOX 2.2CALCULATION OF THE COST OF CAPITAL OF BANKS (cont´d)
Another factor common to European banks that may explain the drop in stock prices is the 
increase in regulatory requirements, which may ultimately translate into higher capital 
requirements or a rise in the cost of bank funding. Specifically, Directive 2014/59/EU, the 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which came into force on 1 January 2016 
(although with a transitional period of four years), introduced a minimum requirement for 
own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for loss absorption and bail-in. This new regulatory 
framework for managing bank crises minimises the need to provide public funds, as it 
places the main burden of resolution costs on shareholders and creditors. 
Another factor to be highlighted is the restrictions on distributions of funds by credit 
institutions. European solvency regulations include, among the capital conservation 
measures, an automatic mechanism8 placing restrictions on distributions linked to Common 
Equity Tier 1 capital (essentially, distribution of dividends), on variable remuneration and on 
payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments (such as coupon payments on contingent 
convertible bonds).
The method used to determine the Maximum Distributable Amount (MDA), setting the 
thresholds that trigger the restrictions, has been subject to interpretations that do not 
always coincide by Community regulatory and supervisory authorities and some EU 
Member States and, in general, by other market agents. That may have contributed to 
prompting some market distortions and, in particular, in the market of additional tier 1 (AT1) 
capital instruments.
The Single Supervisory Mechanism is studying, liaising closely with the European 
Commission and the European Banking Authority, formulas which, while observing the 
regulations in force, will help minimise the distortions indicated.
8  Article 141 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to 
the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms.
…the increase in regulatory 
requirements due to the new 
bail-in rules… 
…and the effect of restrictions 
on distributions of funds
4  The CAPM is an asset valuation model. Its basic implication is that the 
risk premium of an asset is the coefficient resulting from a regression of 
the stock market return for this asset on the market return. It is this 
coefficient that is known as the beta.
5  In particular, it depends on long-term growth expectations, which may 
cause its value to vary by up to one percentage point.
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Lastly, there are elements specific to certain banking systems and financial institutions 
that may also have had an impact on the stock market corrections. The episodes of 
instability in Greece relating to compliance with the measures agreed in its bail-out 
programmes and the negotiations on a possible review of those measures, against a 
backdrop of low growth and severe fiscal adjustment, are a recurrent source of mistrust. 
In turn, in 2015 Germany’s largest bank reported losses of more than €6.7 billion, after 
announcing in October that it would close its operations in ten countries, reduce its 
headcount by 35,000 employees and suspend its dividend for two years (2015 and 2016). 
There were also uncertainties regarding its contingent convertible bonds (CoCos), relating 
both to payment of the yields stipulated in the bonds and their possible conversion into 
instruments that would absorb the reported losses. The bank’s decision, announced in 
mid-February, to buy back some of the debt issued partly mitigated investors’ possible 
doubts regarding its ability to meet all its liabilities. 
It is important to fully understand the ultimate causes of the fall in European banks’ share 
prices because, at such low levels, capital increases to strengthen banks’ solvency prove 
very costly.
As discussed in Chapter 1, since the last FSR the Eurosystem has stepped up its 
expansionary policy considerably. Among the most noteworthy measures, those 
announced on 10 March, when the interest rate on the main refinancing operations was 
There are also elements 
specific to certain banking 
systems and institutions in 
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reduced to zero, the rate on the deposit facility was lowered to –0.40%, monthly purchases 
under the asset purchase programme were increased to €80 billion from April 2016, 
corporate bonds were included in that programme and a new series of four targeted 
longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II) was announced, with certain new features 
compared to the first TLTROs.
Regarding other sources of funding, analysis of the liability-side of deposit institutions’ 
consolidated balance sheets (see Annex 1) shows that, as a percentage of total assets, 
central bank deposits grew while credit institution deposits declined. At the same time, the 
increase in private sector and general government deposits was accompanied by an, 
albeit more moderate, rise in marketable debt securities (up 2%), which held steady as a 
percentage of total assets at 12.3%.
There have been no major changes in the euro area interbank markets since the last FSR. 
Activity has remained weak, chiefly as a consequence of the excess liquidity generated by 
the Eurosystem’s liquidity provision policy, through refinancing operations and various 
asset purchase programmes. Chart 2.16.B depicts EONIA trading volume, which continued 
in the downward path embarked upon in January 2015, posting the lowest levels at year-
end. The Spanish interbank market traced a very similar pattern, with progressively lower 
trading volume both in the secured and unsecured segments, the latter playing a very 
small part.
Funding obtained by Spanish banks through tenders was practically unchanged in 2015. 
Chart 2.16.C depicts the outstanding balance of ECB tenders, both for the Eurosystem as 
a whole and for banks resident in Spain, and shows that, from end-April 2015 to end-April 
2016, gross recourse to the Eurosystem by banks resident in Spain decreased by €2.9 
billion (–2.2%), while the outstanding balance in the Eurosystem as a whole rose by €5.7 
billion (1.1%). In consequence, the share of total Eurosystem loans corresponding to 
Spanish banks decreased in this period (see Chart 2.16.A). Accordingly, as shown in Chart 
2.17.A, the volume allotted in tenders to banks resident in Spain as a percentage of the 
total provided by the Eurosystem averaged 25% in March 2016 compared with 26% in 
October 2015.
Interbank market activity 
in the euro area remained 
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ECB policy
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In 2015, Spanish deposit institutions were more active in issuance than in 2014. This 
growth was most marked in covered bonds. In addition, while it was mainly the largest 
banks that issued senior debt, the medium-sized banks also made covered bond issues in 
2015. On the latest data available, this issuance activity continued in the opening months 
of 2016, especially in the case of covered bonds. Overall, in 2015 and in 2016 to date, 
issues of senior debt amount to more than €15 billion and issues of covered bonds to more 
than €29 billion (see Chart 2.17.B).
At consolidated level, private sector deposits were 6% higher at December 2015 than a 
year earlier. This increase was a consequence of the growth in business abroad, where 
private sector deposits rose by 19%; in business in Spain they declined by 2.5% (see 
Chart 2.18). As indicated earlier, in 2015 exchange rates affected all balance sheet items 
in business abroad.
Retail deposits (deposits of households and non-financial corporations) at Spanish deposit 
institutions, analysed using data from individual statements, corresponding to business in 
Spain, were unchanged as at December 2015 year-on-year. Since early 2015 a certain 
recovery has been observed in the year-on-year rate of change, starting with a slowdown 
in the rate of decline, followed by marginally positive values in recent months (see Chart 
2.19.A). This improvement is also observed if securities issued by deposit institutions to 
households and non-financial corporations, which to a certain extent act as a replacement 
for retail deposits, are included. And this against a backdrop of falling interest rates, which 
have reached historically very low levels, prompting lower returns for customers for savings 
products of this kind marketed by banks. However, despite the poor returns offered by 
deposits, the considerable volatility in the markets in the second half of 2015 dissuaded 
investors, triggering a return, albeit moderate, to bank deposits. In any event, deposits 
continue to offer low rates of return and in recent years this has prompted households and 
non-financial corporations to swap their time deposits for sight deposits (see Chart 2.19.B).
As a result of loans to and deposits of households and non-financial corporations, the 
loan-to-deposit ratio dipped slightly in 2015, continuing in the marked downward pattern 
observed since 2007 (see Chart 2.19.C).
In the first half of 2015 the net asset value of investment funds continued to grow, as both 
net subscriptions and yields increased, but this growth came to a halt in the second half of 
the year as yields became much more volatile (in both directions) and net subscriptions 
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stagnated (see Chart 2.19.D). In the year overall (December 2014 to December 2015), the 
net asset value of investment funds rose by €25 billion (+13%). In the first two months of 
2016 their net asset value declined, chiefly as a consequence of the negative yields but 
this trend changed in March (on the latest data available).
In short, since the second half of 2015 systemic risk and financial market volatility have 
both risen, but this has not resulted in funding difficulties for Spanish banks. Given their 
retail business model, both in Spain and abroad, this volatility has not prevented them from 
maintaining their deposit-based funding, despite the downward pressure on deposit rates.
In 2015, Spanish deposit institutions overall recorded consolidated income attributed to the 
parent institution of €13,781 million, which represented a decline of 12.8% compared with 
2014. Meanwhile, consolidated income was 3.5% lower than a year earlier (see Annex 2). 
The decrease in consolidated income attributed to the parent institution led to a fall of 7 bp 
in the return on assets (ROA) as compared with the previous year, from 0.45% in 2014 to 
0.38% in 2015, compounded by the increase in average total assets recorded in 2015. The 
return on equity (ROE) also fell, from 6.9% in 2014 to 5.6% in 2015, partly as a result of the 
increase in own funds with respect to the previous year.
Higher systemic risk has not 
resulted in funding difficulties 
for Spanish banks 
2.2 Profitability
In 2015, Spanish institutions 
obtained income of €13.8 
billion, down 12.8% from 2014
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The decline in consolidated income of deposit institutions overall is more marked when 
examining the income of institutions at individual level in their business in Spain, as 
analysed in greater detail below. As in previous years, activity abroad continued to grow 
more than domestic activity, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Also, last year, 
the income of the two largest institutions evolved more favourably than that of the rest of 
the sector. However, the banking activity of Spanish institutions abroad is also subject to 
several of the risks analysed in this report, in particular the slowdown of the emerging 
economies and the potential depreciation of their currencies against the euro, which could 
adversely impact their future income.
Analysis of the changes in 2015 consolidated income attributed to the parent institution 
(see Chart 2.20.A) shows that net interest income improved, net commissions rose slightly 
and financial asset impairment losses decreased, all of which contributed favourably to net 
income. In contrast, operating expenses rose, gains and losses on financial transactions 
declined very slightly,9 and the contribution of income from sales fell considerably (partly 
9  In Annex 2, the item relating to gains and losses on financial transactions includes exchange differences. The 
growth in that heading with respect to 2014 offset the negative changes in other transactions, resulting in an 
aggregate financial transactions item that was practically unchanged.
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due to the notably high income recorded in 2014). The result of all of these contributions is 
the abovementioned 7 bp decrease in ROA for Spanish deposit institutions overall in 2015.
Chart 2.20.C shows the contribution, in ATA terms, of the main income statement items to 
the consolidated income attributed to the parent institution from a broader time perspective. 
Firstly, it shows that, despite the low interest rate environment at European level, the 
contribution of net interest income to consolidated income has grown in the last three 
years. The contribution of commissions remained fairly steady throughout the period, 
while that of gains and losses on financial transactions increased until 2013 and fell slightly 
in the last two years, although it is still above the level of the early years. The percentage 
by which operating expenses reduce average total assets has increased since 2012. The 
contribution of financial asset impairment losses (including specific and general provisions) 
played a significant role: in 2012 provisioning increased substantially and was the main 
reason for the fall in income, but from that year on, provisioning was gradually reduced, 
thus contributing to improving income. Given their effect on income, Chart 2.20.B illustrates 
these changes in greater detail, showing the sharp growth, both in absolute terms and as 
a percentage of average total assets, in 2012, and the ensuing gradual decline. Lastly, the 
contribution of the remaining items (mainly income from sales, impairment losses on 
assets other than lending and taxes) is more volatile, but less significant in relative terms 
than the other items.
The profitability of deposit institutions in 2015 in their business in Spain evolved less 
favourably than their consolidated business globally. In 2015, ROE stood at 4.4%, down by 
more than half a percentage point from 5% in 2014. As pointed out in the previous FSR, there 
are three main factors exerting pressure on the income statement in Spain. First, the very low 
interest rate environment currently prevailing in the euro area; second, the still-low level of 
banking activity (as described earlier, the total volume of lending continues to decline); and 
third, the significant volume of non-productive assets (non-performing loans and foreclosed 
assets) still on banks’ balance sheets. However, as already mentioned, non-performing loans 
are declining, which means lower asset impairment provisions and higher income.
As a result of the first pressure factor, that is, the low interest rates prevailing in Europe (not 
only affecting Spanish banks, but also most European banks), average lending and deposit 
rates in the Spanish banking sector are at historically low levels (see Chart 2.21.A). These 
rates, together with the still subdued activity in Spain, have led to a fall of around 2% in net 
interest income. 
In view of the effect of interest rates on profitability and their historically low levels, Box 2.3 
analyses their impact on the income statement. This analysis underlines that a further 
reduction in rates would put even more pressure on net interest income, against a 
background where interest rates for sight deposits are, on average, close to zero. While it 
is true that lower interest rates contribute to reducing non-performing loans by facilitating 
interest payments on loans, these effects would tend to peter out in an environment of very 
low interest rates. Overall, any further decrease in interest rates, in this low interest rate 
environment, would put more pressure on the profitability of the banking business.
Detailed analysis of the various components of the change in net interest income in the last 
two years (see Chart 2.21.B) shows, firstly, that the contribution of the activity level (the 
volume effect) was negative in both years, although the impact was less marked in 2015. 
Secondly, the changes in the balance sheet composition (the structural effect) had a 
favourable impact in both periods, more so in 2015. This change in the composition was 
Impairment losses were 
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since then
The low interest rate 
environment, low level of 
activity and significant volume 
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The current low interest rates have prompted growing concern over 
their impact on bank profits, basically through the erosion of net 
interest income. In a recent article, Borio et al. (20151) analyse a 
panel of international banks from 14 advanced economies in the 
period 1995-2012 and find a positive relationship between the level 
and slope of interest rates and bank profitability.2 Against this 
background, it is appropriate to perform a specific analysis of the 
effect of interest rates on the net interest income of Spanish deposit-
taking institutions’ business in Spain, capturing the macroeconomic 
conditions and sectoral dynamics proper to our banking system.
THE IMPACT OF INTEREST RATES ON THE INCOME STATEMENT BOX 2.3
particularly pronounced in the case of deposits, where the low remuneration on time 
deposits meant that they were replaced by sight deposits (see Chart 2.21.C) which are less 
costly and reduce institutions’ financial costs, favourably affecting net interest income.
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non-?nancial ?rms, while those of liabilities include ?xed-term deposits and repos, among others.
1  The influence of monetary policy on bank profitability (2015) by Claudio 
Borio, Leonardo Gambacorta and Boris Hoffman, BIS Working Paper 
No 514.
2  Borio et al. (2015) consider as explanatory variables the linear and 
quadratic terms for the level and slope of interest rates but they do not 
include the lags of these variables.
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THE IMPACT OF INTEREST RATES ON THE INCOME STATEMENT (cont´d) BOX 2.3
improvement in net interest income for low EURIBOR levels and 
with a deterioration in net interest income for high EURIBOR 
levels. This is because at low (high) rates, the positive effect of a 
rise in the 12-month EURIBOR on the rate spread predominates 
over (is dominated by) the negative effect on the volume of 
activity (quantity effect). It should be remembered in this exercise 
that not only the effects on the remuneration of assets and 
liabilities, but also those on the volume of intermediation (quantity 
effect), are taken into account. Thus, it is observed that although 
the asset/liability spread increases with the level of the 12-month 
EURIBOR, once the contraction in volume of business associated 
with higher rates is taken into account, net interest income is 
ultimately affected negatively by high values of the 12-month 
EURIBOR.
It may be inferred from the analysis that additional decreases in 
interest rates in the current environment of very low but still-
positive rates would cause additional contraction in net interest 
income, exerting even more downward pressure on the profits of 
banking business in Spain. However, in that territory, interest rates 
have a moderating effect on loan loss provisions.
It should be noted that there are risks in extending the analysis to 
the negative territory of rates since, firstly, historical experience 
does not include periods of negative benchmark rates, thereby 
making it impossible to estimate their effects precisely. Secondly, 
the existence of negative interest rates marks a regime shift which 
may alter the relationships previously observed between 
macroeconomic variables and net interest income. 
Specifically, an analysis was performed of the relationship between 
the 12-month EURIBOR, the main benchmark in the Spanish 
banking sector, and interest income and expense of the business 
in Spain of deposit-taking institutions as a whole in the period 
2000-2014. Profit behaviour is broken down into changes in 
balance sheet items (quantities) and changes in their average 
prices (rates or yields). On the assets side, a distinction is made 
between credit, debt instruments and other assets, whereas on 
the liabilities side, it is made between sight deposits, time deposits 
and other funding.
For each relevant variable a linear regression model was developed 
with a set of explanatory variables which include the 12-month 
EURIBOR (linear and quadratic term) and other macroeconomic 
variables (GDP, unemployment rate, house prices, etc.) and the 
lags of all these variables. The specification used for each variable 
complies with economic requirements (adequate signs of 
explanatory variables) and statistical requirements (p-value lower 
than 10% of individual variables, sufficient explanatory power of 
the model).
The models estimated are used to obtain a measure of the semi-
elasticity of net interest income to changes in the 12-month 
EURIBOR. The measure of semi-elasticity used provides 
information on the relative change in the reference variable in 
response to a relative increase of 100 bp in the level of the 
12-month EURIBOR in the period studied.3 Since the quadratic 
terms and lags of the 12-month EURIBOR are included in the 
regression models, these semi-elasticities depend on both the 
level of the 12-month EURIBOR and its pattern of change.
Chart A shows the semi-elasticity of net interest income 
evaluated at different levels of the 12-month EURIBOR and at 
average sample values of the macroeconomic variables. It shows 
how a rise in the 12-month EURIBOR is associated with an 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The y-axis shows the semi-elasticity of net interest income to different levels of the 12-month EURIBOR in the range of 0.5-5.5, which are depicted on the x-axis. 
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Chart A
SEMI-ELASTICITY OF NET INTEREST INCOME TO 12-MONTH EURIBOR (a)
Business in Spain, ID
3  Semi-elasticity is calculated in accordance with the formula: semi-elas(t) = 
[∂y(t)/∂Euribor]∙[1/y(t)], where y(t) is the value of the dependent variable 
and ∂y(t)/∂Euribor is the derivative of the dependent variable with 
respect to 12-month EURIBOR.
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Finally, the impact on net interest income of the interest rates on interest-earning assets 
and interest-bearing liabilities (the price effect) has gone from being slightly positive in 
2014 to negative in 2015. As shown in Chart 2.21.D, in 2015 the decline in the marginal 
rates on new lending transactions was more marked than in the case of new deposit 
transactions. However, on the liabilities side, there is increasingly less room for manoeuvre, 
as illustrated by Chart 2.22.A, which shows the fall in interest rates on new sight and time 
deposits of households and non-financial corporations, along with the fall in the deposit 
facility rate. Likewise, Chart 2.22.B shows that average costs in 2015 fell the most at the 
Spanish deposit institutions that had the highest average costs in 2014. Both charts seem 
to suggest that little room remains for financial costs to reach their lower limit, and if 
lending rates continue to decline, so will net interest income.
Continuing with the analysis of the remaining items of the income statement in Spain, both 
the return on equity instruments and gains (losses) on financial transactions decreased 
substantially between December 2014 and December 2015, leading to a decline in gross 
income of nearly 7% year-on-year. Net commissions remained practically unchanged in 
2015, continuing in the pattern observed in previous quarters with a rise in commissions 
on the sale of non-banking financial services and a fall in commissions from collection and 
payment services (more related to banking). 
The scope for the further 
downward course of financial 
costs is limited
Gross income decreased by 
nearly 7% in 2015
PROFITABILITY
Business in Spain, ID
CHART 2.22
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Operating expenses rose slightly, adversely affecting net operating income. Although the 
capacity adjustment process continued, through cut-backs in offices and employees (see 
Chart 2.23.A), the increase in average costs per office and employee prompted this slight 
rise in the operating costs of the activity in Spain.
A comparison at European level of the efficiency ratio, based on the data published by the 
EBA in its 2015 transparency exercise, shows that (see Chart 2.24) the ratio of Spanish 
banks is below that of its peers in the main EU countries. Thus, in terms of efficiency, 
Spanish banks are in a good position relative to their European counterparts.
As in the case of consolidated activity, but more markedly so, financial asset impairment 
losses continued to decline in 2015 in business in Spain. The aforementioned decrease in 
non-performing loans (see Chart 2.8) enabled the level of provisioning to be reduced, with 
the consequent improvement in income. As a result of all the above factors, net income of 
deposit institutions in Spain fell by 5.4% overall in 2015.
In short, analysis of the results of Spanish deposit institutions in 2015 shows that several 
factors continue to put pressure on their income statements, particularly on their business 
in Spain. Since ROE levels are currently lower than the cost of capital in many cases, 
profitability has become one of the main challenges/risk factors now facing Spanish and 
euro area banks. As mentioned earlier, the pressure on the profitability of the banking 
business in Europe is one of the factors explaining the decline in bank share prices in 
recent months, which has led to a fall in the price-to-book-value of European banks (Chart 
2.23.B). This decline has been more pronounced for Spanish banks, which had higher 
values to begin with. However, price-to-book-value at Spanish banks is still higher than at 
the main banking systems in the euro area.
In December 2015 the ratio of highest-quality capital, i.e. common equity tier 1 (CET1) 
stood at 12.6% at aggregate level for Spanish deposit institutions as a whole. In 2015 this 
ratio increased by more than 80 bp with respect to the 11.8% recorded in December 2014, 
amply exceeding its regulatory requirement.10 In Spanish deposit institutions this 
improvement was across-the-board.
10  The capital conservation buffer, which in 2016 raises by 0.625% the minimum CET1 requirement of 4.5%, is 
being phased in from 1 January 2016.
The decrease in asset 
impairment losses contributed 
favourably to income in 2015
In short, profitability is one of 
the main challenges currently 
facing Spanish banks and 
their euro area counterparts
2.3 Solvency
The CET1 ratio stood at 
12.6% in December 2015 after 
having increased by more than 
80 bp in the past year
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The total capital ratio and the tier 1 capital ratio behaved similarly during the previous year, 
since they also increased by more than 80 bp between December 2014 and December 
2015 (see Chart 2.25) and stood above their minimum regulatory levels. The total capital 
ratio stood at 14.5% at end-2015 and the tier 1 capital ratio (CET1 plus additional tier 1 
capital) was slightly above the CET1 ratio (12.7%) due to the effect of gradual transitional 
adjustments, particularly in relation to deductions.11
In absolute terms, CET1 increased in 2015 by nearly €17 billion to stand on the verge of 
€213 billion at the end of the year. Total capital rose by slightly more (€18 billion) in the past 
year and its stock exceeded €243 billion in December 2015 (see Chart 2.26.A).
As regards the numerators of the ratios, the composition of own funds scarcely changed 
in 2015. CET1 makes up the vast bulk of own funds (87%) and the rest of them are mainly 
tier 2 capital (see Chart 2.26.B). A detailed breakdown of the main component of own 
funds, namely CET1, shows that equity instruments are the most significant item of eligible 
capital (43%), followed by reserves (33%). Thus these two items together exceed 75% of 
eligible capital, being followed by transitional adjustments (16%) and minority interests 
and other (8%). For their part, deductions arise mostly from goodwill and other intangible 
assets, which amount to practically 60%, well ahead of those arising from deferred tax 
assets (15%) and other deductions (25%). Chart 2.26.C shows this CET1 structure in 
terms of risk-weighted assets (RWAs).
Turning to the denominator of the capital ratios, risk-weighted assets amounted to €1,684 
billion at end-2015, up 1.6% with respect to RWAs at December 2014 (see Chart 2.26.A). 
RWAs as a proportion of the total assets of deposit institutions decreased slightly, since 
total assets increased by a slightly higher proportion. Thus RWAs as a percentage of total 
assets approached 46%. The composition of risk-weighted assets barely changed in the 
past year. Most of them (87%) arose from credit and counterparty risk,12 followed by 
operational risk (9%) and position, foreign exchange and commodity risks (4%), while 
other risks account for less than 1% of RWAs (see Chart 2.26.D). 
11   The ratios take into account the transitional adjustments designed to facilitate the progressive implementation 
of Basel III. The implementation timetable establishes that in 2015 generally only 40% of the amounts of 
deductions will be deducted from common equity, while the remaining 60% will be deducted from additional 
tier 1 capital. In quantitative terms, the main transitional adjustments are those relating to deductions of 
intangible assets and to deductions of deferred tax assets based on future income.
12   This risk comprises that from credit exposures, equity exposures and securitisation positions, and includes 
both that calculated using RWAs obtained by the standardised method and that obtained by the IRB method.
The total capital ratio 
and the tier 1 capital ratio 
also increased by more than 
80 bp in 2015
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In 2015 the European Banking Authority published the results of its transparency exercise 
for the European banking sector, which, together with the data of the 2014 stress exercise, 
are analysed in Box 2.4. These data allow a comparison at European level of the solvency 
situation of the various banking systems. Firstly, the CET1 ratio is analysed at three different 
points in time: December 2013, December 2014 and June 2015. Chart 2.27.A shows, first, 
that the CET1 ratio of nearly all European countries grew gradually over the three points in 
time. Second, the ratio of the Spanish banks included in the EBA exercises stands at a 
medium-low level with respect to the main European countries and below the European 
average. However, the growth in recent periods has helped to bring Spanish banks’ ratios 
nearer to those of the banks of the main European countries included in the EBA exercises.
Second, the Texas ratio, which, as explained above in this report, is another measure of 
bank solvency, shows most particularly how banks’ troubled assets derived from their 
lending activity may affect their solvency. Chart 2.27.B depicts an approximation of the 
Texas ratio for the banks included in the EBA transparency exercise. To calculate the ratio, 
non-performing loans13 were divided by the sum of provisions and capital (including equity 
instruments eligible as CET1 and reserves). This metric, which is based on the two figures 
available (December 2014 and June 2015), reflects a slight decline in the ratio over these 
13  Given the unavailability of data on foreclosed assets, only non-performing loans are included in the numerator. 
The use of consolidated data of the banks included in the EBA transparency exercise means that the definition 
of the ratio, the source of the data, the scope of consolidation and the banks included in the analysis are 
different from those of the ratio of Chart 2.11.
On EBA data, the CET1 
ratio of Spanish banks is at a 
medium-low level with respect 
to Europe…
…while the Texas ratio stands 
at a medium-high level 
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banks and in the density of the risk-weighted assets (RWAs) 
associated with these exposures.2 
The publication by the EBA of the results of the 2015 transparency 
exercise for the European banking sector provides publicly 
available granular data on the capital positions and risk exposures 
of 105 European banks.1 This Box combines the data from that 
transparency exercise with the public data of the 2014 EBA stress 
test exercise in order to measure the changes between December 
2013 and June 2015 in the volume of credit exposures of European 
BOX 2.4CREDIT EXPOSURES AND RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS: ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN BANKS
six months for nearly all the countries considered. The ratio for Spanish banks stands at a 
medium-high level with respect to other European countries, being slightly above the 
average of the banks included in the EBA exercise, although at values well below those of 
the banking systems which enjoy much higher ratios.
In short, the ongoing efforts of Spanish banks in 2015 to strengthen their solvency gave 
rise to an increase in the absolute amount of their own funds and to an improvement in 
their capital ratios, which are approaching the levels of the main European countries, 
although they are still somewhat below them. 
In short, in 2015 Spanish 
banks continued to strengthen 
their solvency 
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a Only 2013 data are available for Greece.
1  The results of the 2015 EBA transparency exercise are available at: 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/r isk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-
transparency-exercise/2015/results.
2  The results of the 2014 EBA stress test exercise are available at: http://www.
eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2014/results.
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CREDIT EXPOSURES AND RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS: ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN BANKS (cont´d) BOX 2.4
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1. Volume of credit exposures under the IRB and SA approaches
Chart A shows the changes from December 2013 to June 2015 in 
credit exposures and in their distribution between the SA and IRB 
approaches. The level of exposure for the total countries in the 
sample increases very moderately (except for the United Kingdom). 
Exposure under the SA approach expressed as a proportion of 
total exposure remained practically constant in all countries. The 
moderate growth in the period did not lead to a marked redistribution 
of credit exposures between the SA and IRB portfolios.
Spain, along with Italy, is the country with the highest proportion of 
exposure subject to the SA approach. This proportion is not 
altered by the 5.8% growth in the period 2013-2015 of the credit 
exposures of the Spanish banks in the sample.
The data of the Spanish banks participating in the EBA exercise 
and of the five reference countries (Germany, France, United 
Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands) are analysed. The analysis 
distinguishes between exposures subject to the standardised 
approach (SA) and those under the so-called internal ratings 
based (IRB) approach. The total exposure of each country 
considered is taken to be that resulting from the sum of domestic 
and international exposures.
This Box continues and updates the analysis published in the 
May 2015 FSR, which identified notable differences between risk-
weighted asset densities (and thus capital requirements) in the 
portfolios subject to the standardised approach and the IRB 
approach, as well as marked dispersion across countries, 
particularly in portfolios subject to the IRB approach.
CREDIT EXPOSURES AND RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS: ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN BANKS (cont´d) BOX 2.4
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CREDIT EXPOSURES AND RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS: ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN BANKS (cont´d) BOX 2.4
3. Changes in exposure and RWA density in corporate and retail 
portfolios subject to the IRB approach
This section looks at changes in the credit exposure and in the 
density of the RWAs associated with each portfolio.
 3.1 Corporate
Chart D shows changes in the exposure of the corporate portfolio 
under the IRB approach for each of the countries in the period 
from December 2013 to June 2015. The volume of exposure for 
the total sample increased significantly from €4,500 million to 
€5,225 million. This increase mainly reflects the effect of the rise in 
this portfolio in the United Kingdom. In Spain, the country with the 
lowest exposure in this portfolio, the relative increase in exposure 
was 17% from 2013 to 2015.
Chart E shows changes in RWA density. In all the countries 
analysed, the densities remained steady, with a slight downward 
trend. Comparison of the charts shows that the increase in 
exposure was not accompanied by large changes in RWA density.
 3.2 Retail
Chart F shows that the volume of exposure of the retail portfolio 
increased in all countries except Italy. The United Kingdom 
showed the highest increase, followed by Spain.
Chart G shows RWA density. For the total sample, this density 
decreased by only one percentage point from 2013 to 2015. The 
largest decrease was in the United Kingdom. In Spain this density 
decreased by one percentage point, a fall in line with that seen 
for the total sample. The expansion of gross credit exposure was 
accompanied by only slight falls in RWA density for the sample 
as a whole.
Chart B shows the relative growth between December 2013 and 
June 2015 in the volumes of SA, IRB and total exposures for the 
different countries studied, as well as that of the total sample. The 
exposure under the IRB approach showed higher growth (8.2%), 
more than double that of the SA exposure (3.6%).
The United Kingdom is the country with the highest increase in the 
total volume of exposures (17.1%), the growth of which is evenly 
spread between SA and IRB exposures. In the case of Spain, the 
increase is clearly concentrated in the IRB exposure (11.9%) 
compared with the more sluggish SA exposure (1.4%).
2. RWA density under the IRB and SA approaches
The SA and IRB methodologies involve risk weights which are 
steady over time. The average RWA density is partly determined 
by these weights, so it may be expected to show little change over 
time. However, the relative volume of exposure in portfolios with 
differing weights also affects RWA density and indeed, a priori, 
greater variation over time can be seen in this component. This 
variation in the relative volumes of exposure may be due to an 
inflow of new credit, to inflows and outflows of NPLs, to transfers 
of funds between existing portfolios subject to the same calculation 
method, or to transfers between SA and IRB portfolios.
Chart C shows changes in RWA density of the total countries analysed 
for the standardised and IRB approaches and for the total, with data 
at December 2013, December 2014 and June 2015. The largest 
change was observed in the exposures under the standardised 
method, which went from a density of 43% in 2013 to one of 40% in 
2015. The density of the exposures under the IRB approach rose by 
one percentage point from 32% in 2013 to 33% in 2015. The changes 
in RWA density observed for the various countries of the sample are 
of moderate size, indicating a certain stability in the distribution of 
exposure across the various credit portfolios in the period analysed.
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3  MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY: MACROPRUDENTIAL INSTRUMENTS 
AND FIRST DECISIONS ADOPTED
Recent years have seen a far-reaching reform of the regulatory framework to which banks are 
subject. Its most innovative features include the implementation of a number of regulatory 
instruments the use of which falls in the realm of macroprudential policy.1 The ultimate 
objective of macroprudential policy is to help protect the stability of the financial system as a 
whole, while microprudential policy continues to be responsible for ensuring the solvency of 
each bank separately. In particular, macroprudential policy seeks, firstly, to develop and 
apply instruments to mitigate and address systemic risks which develop during the course of 
the credit cycle (time dimension) and, secondly, to use another set of instruments with a 
cross-sectional dimension to address the impact on systemic risk derived from the size, 
complexity and interconnectedness of banks (cross-sectional or structural dimension).
European legislation provides macroprudential instruments through Directive 2013/36/EU 
(CRD IV) and Regulation EU 575/2013 (CRR), as shown in Table 3.1. The CRR is directly 
applicable and thus does not require transposition to Spanish law. CRD IV was transposed 
to Spanish law through Law 10/2014 and Royal Decree 84/2015, which assign competences 
in macroprudential instruments to the Banco de España. More recently, Banco de España 
Circular 2/2016 was approved which specifies in more detail these competences, along 
with reporting transparency requirements and relationships with European authorities.
The aforementioned instruments include most notably the countercyclical capital buffer and 
the capital buffers for systemically important institutions. The countercyclical capital buffer 
(CCB) is an instrument introduced in the framework of Basel III to ensure that the banking 
sector as a whole has an additional capital buffer to help maintain the flow of credit to the 
economy without the system’s solvency being jeopardised in the event of tension in the 
Macroprudential policy aims to 
protect the financial system as 
a whole
Circular 2/2016 sets out in 
detail the competences of the 
Banco de España in the 
macroprudential area
The countercyclical capital 
buffer is designed to address 
the time dimension of 
macroprudential policy
1  A general description of the macroprudential policy objectives, instruments and indicators of the Banco de España 
can be found in Occasional Paper No. 1601 by J. Mencía and J. Saurina.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The CRD (Capital Requirements Directive) has been transposed to national legislation, while the CRR (Capital Requirements Regulation) is directly applicable.
noitpircseDytilibacilppAsisab lageLtnemurtsnI
Counterciclycal capital buffer (CCB) CRD:130, 135-140 Obligatory Additional capital buffer built up in expansions in order 
to absorb losses in recessions.
Systemically important institutions CRD: 131 Obligatory for G-SIIs.
Optional for O-SIIs.
Additional capital buffer to address externalities caused 
by global (G-SIIs) and domestic (O-SIIs) systemic 
institutions alike.
 lacilcyc-non etagitim dna tneverp ot reffub latipaClanoitpO431 ,331 :DRC)BRS( reffub ksir cimetsyS
systemic risks that are not contemplated in the CRR.
Liquidity requirements under Pillar 2 CRD: 105 Optional Treatment of systemic liquidity risk through liquidity 
surcharges.
Other macroprudential uses under Pillar 2 CRD: 103 Optional Treatment of systemic risks arising from institutions  
??????? ????????????
?????? ??????????????????? ??????????????) CRR: 458 Optional Stricter requirements in capital, conservation buffer, 
liquidity, large exposures, reporting and risk 
weightings
Higher risk weightings and stricter credit standards 
imposed on the real estate sector
CRR: 124 Optional
Higher minimum LGDs CRR: 164 Optional
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reasoning is similar to that of the CCB, but applied 
to the real estate sector.
MACROPRUDENTIAL INSTRUMENTS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE UNDER EUROPEAN AND SPANISH LEGISLATION (a) TABLE 3.1
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financial system brought on by a prior period of excessive credit growth. In this respect, it is 
an instrument designed to address the time dimension of systemic risks, i.e. those stemming 
from excessive growth of aggregate credit. This buffer has to be reviewed quarterly.
Capital buffers for systemically important institutions seek to address macroprudential 
risks in their cross-sectional or structural dimension. Specifically, they are additional 
capital buffers applicable to systemically more important institutions, both those 
considered to be of global systemic importance (G-SIIs) and those of systemic importance 
at the national level (O-SIIs). The aim here is to strengthen these institutions’ solvency to 
make them less likely to fail and thereby reduce any adverse externalities on the overall 
banking system arising from their failure. Furthermore, this measure should mitigate the 
moral hazard for managers posed by the size and complexity of these institutions through 
a capital surcharge with respect to other institutions, while offsetting the potential 
competitive advantage these institutions may have in the funding market due to their 
systemic nature. These buffers are to be reviewed annually from 2016 onwards.
The other instruments available, the use of which is optional, supplement those described 
above to cover more fully the potential threats to the system. In particular, CRD IV provides 
for a systemic risk buffer to prevent and mitigate structural systemic risks by increasing 
the loss absorption capacity of the system or its components. It is a flexible instrument 
which can be applied to the banking system as a whole or to a subset of banks. Accordingly, 
it is also a cross-sectional tool. Additionally, CRD IV also allows a macroprudential use of 
the Pillar 2 tools available, such as capital surcharges or more transparent reporting.
The CRR provides flexibility to impose, at the national level, stricter prudential requirements 
in a number of instruments, such as the capital conservation buffer, liquidity requirements 
or large exposures. The CRR also allows risk weights and loss given default (LGD) to be 
raised for the residential and commercial real estate sectors. These measures should only 
be applied when the national authority determines that the other instruments available 
cannot adequately control systemic risk. 
Systemically important institutions 
At end-2015 the Banco de España approved the list of systemically important institutions 
which will be in force in 2016. In the case of global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs), 
the Banco de España used the methodology developed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and accepted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). Specifically, the methodology 
assesses the systemic importance of each institution by calculating 12 indicators which are 
aggregated to arrive at a final score. This score is used to identify whether an institution is 
systemically important and to determine its level, i.e. its position relative to other institutions. 
This relative position is what finally determines the capital surcharge assigned to each 
institution. The application of this methodology led Santander and BBVA to be identified as 
G-SIIs in 2014 with consequences in terms of capital requirements as from 1 January 2016.2 
This list came into force in 2016 because the FSB stipulates that a period of 14 months must 
elapse between the identification of the G-SIIs and the entry into force of the capital buffers. 
Both these institutions were identified as G-SIIs in sub-category one, to which a capital buffer 
of 1% applies.3 However, this buffer is implemented gradually over a period of four years, so 
only 25% of the buffer will be required in 2016.
The buffers for systemically 
important institutions address 
the cross-sectional or 
structural dimension 
The systemic risk buffer allows 
structural systemic risks to be 
mitigated by increasing the 
loss absorption capacity of the 
system or its components 
The CRR introduces 
additional national discretions 
for instances in which 
the previous instruments 
are not effective
3.1  Decisions adopted 
at end-2015 
The Banco de España has 
identified two globally 
systemically important 
institutions for 2016
2  BBVA was not identified as a G-SII in the list published by the FSB in November 2015 and, consequently, will not be 
required to have the capital buffer in 2017.
3  Calculated as CET1 divided by total risk exposure at consolidated level.
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In identifying other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs), the Banco de España 
applied the guidelines of the European Banking Authority, which propose assessing the 
systemic importance of institutions by means of the aggregation of a set of 10 indicators. 
For institutions with scores above the minimum threshold set in the methodology, capital 
buffers were calculated by a simple mechanism for converting scores into capital which 
maintains consistency both with the differences between O-SII scores and with the G-SII 
buffers. It resulted in the identification of six banks as O-SIIs: Santander, BBVA, Caixabank, 
Bankia, Popular and Sabadell. As with G-SIIs, a period was established for gradual 
implementation over four years. Thus a requirement of only 25% of the total buffer has 
been approved for 2016.
Finally, the regulations provide that where a bank is classified as both a G-SII and an O-SII, 
the higher of the two buffers will apply. Table 3.2 shows the resulting buffers.
Countercyclical capital buffer 
As noted above, the CCB seeks to prevent and mitigate cyclical risks derived from 
excessive aggregate credit growth. In this respect, the CCB should rise in periods of build-
up of systemic risks due to excessive growth of aggregate credit, and should be reduced 
or deactivated when those risks dissipate or materialise. In line with the provisions of Law 
10/2014, Royal Decree 84/2015 and Banco de España Circular 2/2016, the framework for 
setting the CCB (i.e. its activation, build-up, reduction and deactivation) follows a “guided 
(or bounded) discretion” approach, where, in addition to qualitative information and expert 
judgement, specific quantitative indicators are used as a source of guidance of the level of 
the CCB.
The initial quantitative reference indicator proposed by Basel III to guide the setting of the 
CCB, and recognised in the CRD IV and in Spanish legislation, as well as by the ESRB, is 
the so-called credit-to-GDP gap. In order to guide the setting of the CCB in accordance 
with this indicator, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision also proposed a rule or 
reference threshold. Under this rule, if the credit-to-GDP gap is two percentage points or 
less, the related countercyclical capital buffer guide or requirement is 0%, and where the 
credit-to-GDP gap exceeds 2%, the applicable buffer guide increases linearly until it 
reaches 2.5%, where the credit-to-GDP gap is 10%.4 The ESRB recommendation on the 
CCB suggests the possibility of using, in addition to the credit-to-GDP gap, other 
complementary indicators grouped into different categories, including possible alternative 
specifications for the credit-to-GDP gap.5 
Six banks were identified as 
other systemically important 
institutions 
The final buffer is the higher of 
the G-SII and O-SII buffers
The CCB seeks to prevent and 
mitigate cyclical risks derived 
from excessive aggregate 
credit growth 
The credit-to-GDP gap is the 
initial reference indicator 
proposed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking 
Supervision
4  The Banco de España has discretion to set a countercyclical buffer at a level of above 2.5% whenever justified by 
the considerations referred to in Rule 9(1)(b) of Banco de España Circular 2/2016.
5  ESRB Recommendation of 18 June 2014 on guidance for setting countercyclical buffer rates (ESRB/2014/1).
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Institutions G-SIIs (%) O-SIIs (%) Buffer applicable (%) Buffer required in 2016 (%)
52.000.100.100.1rednatnaS
52.000.105.000.1AVBB
5260.052.052.0—knabaxiaC
5260.052.052.0—aiknaB
000—ralupoP
000—lledabaS
CAPITAL BUFFERS FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS IN 2016 TABLE 3.2
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 60 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, MAY 2016
Based on a technical analysis by the Banco de España and on ESRB Recommendation 
2014/1 on the CCB, the credit-to-GDP gap was calculated and its suitability for Spain was 
analysed. In addition to this, it was considered advisable to supplement the information 
from the credit-to-GDP gap with information on the level of the credit-to-GDP ratio used to 
construct the reference indicator proposed in Basel III and also envisaged in Banco de 
España Circular 2/2016, as well as a number of complementary indicators. In particular, 
four complementary indicators were identified to help guide the activation and functioning of 
the CCB in Spain: (i) credit intensity; (ii) price gap in the real estate sector; (iii) debt burden of 
the non-financial private sector (debt service ratio, DSR); and (iv) current account imbalances. 
In this way, the credit-to-GDP gap, the credit-to-GDP ratio and the four complementary 
indicators mentioned above constitute the so-called “core indicators” to help guide the 
activation of the CCB in Spain. Apart from this, as additional support information, various 
structural versions of the core indicators have been developed in which the long-term trend 
for the indicators is calculated using an econometric model rather than a statistical filter.
The press release published on 21 March 2016 indicates that the position of these 
indicators is as follows (see Table 3.3).
In line with the primary objective of the CCB, all the indicators were selected and assessed 
on the basis of their ability to provide information on the creation of systemic risk associated 
with periods of excessive credit growth.6 In other words, the historical evidence in Spain 
shows that sustained increases above certain levels of the selected indicators have 
generally been associated with periods of excessive build-up of systemic risk due to 
oversupply of credit at aggregate level, which in turn are liable to produce stress events or 
banking crises. Given this, the information from these indicators, along with the other 
significant quantitative and qualitative information, constitutes the reference framework 
Decisions on activating the 
CCB in Spain are guided by 
the credit-to-GDP gap, the 
credit-to-GDP ratio and a set 
of complementary core 
indicators 
All the indicators have been 
selected and assessed on the 
basis of their ability to provide 
information on the risks which 
the CCB seeks to prevent and 
mitigate 
Latest value
(Sep 2015)
Previous
quarter
Average
since
1970
Minimum
since
1970
Maximum
since 1970
Standard
deviation
since 1970
Average
1999-2008
(a)
Minimum
since
1999
Maximum
since
1999
1  Credit-to-GDP gap (b) -57.7 -54.3 (g) 2.1 -57.7 45.4 19.9 30.7 -57.7 45.4
9.7126.190.9412.849.7124.377.6112.1816.671Credit-to-GDP ratio  2
8.531.71-6.129.98.531.71-8.01)g( 9.7-0.8-)c( ytisnetni tiderC  3
4  Prices in the real estate sector (d) [-27.9 -19.7] [-30.5 -21.3] [-5.4 -2.4] [-43 -31.9] [22.6 27.8] [13.3 18.1] [6.8 13.9] [-43 -31.9] [21.7 26.6]
???????????????????????????????
    debt burden (e) 17.2 17.6 18.4 12.0 24.4 2.9 17.7 12.5 24.4
6  External imbalances (f) 1.5 1.2 -2.3 -10.3 3.1 3.0 -6.1 -10.3 2.2
CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP AND COMPLEMENTARY CORE INDICATORS TO GUIDE THE ACTIVATION 
OF THE CCB IN SPAIN
TABLE 3.3
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
a The year 1999 marks Spain’s joining the euro area; the year 2008 marks the last year before the start of the recent systemic banking crisis in Spain.
b The credit-to-GDP gap is calculated as the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend, using a one-tailed Hodrick-Prescott ??ter (smoothing 
parameter equal to 400,000). 
c ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
d The ranges in each column show minimum and maximum values of a set of indicators of price developments in the real estate sector in respect of their long-term 
trends, obtained using a one-tailed Hodrick-Prescott ??ter (smoothing parameter equal to 400,000 in all cases). 
e Use is made of the debt service ratio in the non-?nancial private sector, calculated according to the speci?cation in Drehmann M. and M. Juselius (2012) “Do debt 
service costs affect macroeconomic and ?nancial stability?”, BIS Quarterly Review, September. 
f The indicator of external imbalances is calculated as the current account balance divided by GDP.
g These values differ slightly from those published for the quarter in question in the “Brie?ng note on the setting of buffers for systemic institutions and of the 
countercyclical buffer for 2016”, dated 11.01.2016. This is due to the updating of the GDP data (?ash estimates) published by INE.
6  The details of the process of selecting and assessing core indicators for guiding the use of the CCB are described in 
Castro, C., A. Estrada and J. Martínez, “The countercyclical capital buffer in Spain: an exploratory analysis of key 
guiding indicators”, published in Estabilidad Financiera No. 27, Banco de España, 31-59, 2014; and Castro, C., A. 
Estrada and J. Martínez (2016), “The countercyclical capital buffer in Spain: an analysis of key guiding indicators”, 
Banco de España Working Paper No. 1601.
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used by the Banco de España for taking decisions on activation of the CCB in Spain. For 
illustrative purposes, the content of Table 3.3 is described below using some of the 
complementary core indicators considered in the analysis.
The credit-to-GDP gap seeks to measure the excess of credit (in terms of output) with 
respect to its long-term (or equilibrium) level. The credit-to-GDP gap is calculated as the 
following difference in percentage points: the ratio which results from dividing total credit 
to the private sector by GDP less the long-term trend of that ratio estimated using a 
statistical filter (the recursive Hodrick-Prescott filter). 
The behaviour of the two components of the gap, namely the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-
term trend, is shown in Chart 3.1.A. This chart can be used to assess the behaviour of the 
credit-to-GDP ratio in the past three financial crises. The blue bars in the chart show three 
periods of financial crisis identified in Spain since 1960. These consist of two system-wide 
banking crises (that of the 1970s from 1978 Q1 to 1985 Q3 and the recent crisis from 2009 
Q2 to 2013 Q4) and an idiosyncratic event (the Banesto crisis from 1993 Q3 to 1994 Q3). It 
can be seen that in the periods preceding the crises, the indebtedness of the economy tended 
to increase. However, the level of indebtedness in the years preceding the last crisis was 
notably higher than in the previous episodes, with credit rising to levels of 220% of GDP in 
June 2010. Since then, the credit-to-GDP ratio has decreased on a sustained basis. Currently 
The credit-to-GDP gap seeks 
to capture information on the 
excessive credit in terms 
of output 
The credit-to-GDP gap lies 
well below the activation 
threshold proposed by the 
Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. Also, the 
behaviour of the credit-to-
GDP ratio is consistent with 
a gradual correction of 
accumulated imbalances 
COMPLEMENTARY CORE INDICATORS FOR THE ACTIVATION OF THE CCB (a) CHART 3.1
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a Shaded areas show three periods of ?nancial crisis identi?ed in Spain since 1960. These refer to two periods of systemic banking crises (the crisis of the 1970s: 
1978 Q1-1985 Q3; and the recent crisis: 2009 Q2-2013 Q4) and an idiosyncratic event (Banesto crisis: 1993 Q3-1994 Q3).
b The trend of the credit-to-GDP ratio is calculated using a one-tailed Hodrick-Prescott ??ter (smoothing parameter equal to 400,000).
c The credit intensity indicator is calculated as the annual difference in credit to the non-?nancial private sector divided by cumulative GDP of the last four quarters. 
d The debt service ratio is calculated according  to the speci?cation in Drehmann M. and M. Juselius (2012) "Do debt service costs affect macroeconomic and 
?nancial stability?", BIS Quarterly Review, September.
%
D  DEBT SERVICE RATIO (DSR) (d)
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it still stands at a value near 180% due to the high persistence of this ratio. Consequently, this 
indicator is consistent with the process of correction of accumulated imbalances and thus 
does not evidence the need to activate the CCB at this moment. Meanwhile, the initial reference 
indicator proposed by Basel, the credit-to-GDP gap, stood in clearly negative territory in 
September 2015, at a value near –58 pp (see Chart 3.1.B), still far from the activation threshold 
(2 pp) in the guide suggested by Basel, under which capital begins to be required linearly from 
2 pp until a level of 2.5% is reached, where the credit-to-GDP gap stands at 10 pp. 
The credit intensity indicator seeks to capture information on the acceleration of credit growth 
in terms of output during a given period, in this case one year. Hence the indicator is calculated 
as the annual change in aggregate credit (numerator) divided by the cumulative output for the 
same period (denominator). This indicator is included under the “measures of credit 
developments” heading within the group of other indicators (complementing the credit-to-
GDP gap) which guide the setting of the CCB indicated in ESRB Recommendation 2014/1.
Like the credit-to-GDP gap, the credit intensity indicator remained in negative territory in 
September 2015, albeit with a change in trend from December 2013 (see Chart 3.1.C). 
Although the behaviour of this indicator seems to be taking it to positive territory as a result 
of a still-incipient recovery in aggregate credit, the qualitative and quantitative analysis of 
its behaviour in the periods preceding the three crises in Spain since the early 1970s 
shows that it is still below the levels signalling excessive acceleration and, therefore, does 
not suggest a need to activate the CCB at present.
The private sector debt burden indicator (debt service ratio, DSR) seeks to capture the 
degree of debt servicing ability in the private sector along with possible situations of 
unsustainability in the sector’s debt level which point to, among other things, a foreseeable 
increase in the number of loan write-offs. In addition to this, banks’ perceptions of the 
sustainability of private sector indebtedness incentivise/constrain the availability of credit in 
good/bad times, thus amplifying the fluctuations in the credit cycle. The DSR is defined as 
the ratio of interest and principal payments to aggregate disposable income, so it measures 
the affordability of debt payments with respect to disposable income.7 This indicator is 
constructed according to a standard formula for calculating the present value of a fixed-term 
loan (using the stock of aggregate credit along with an average interest rate and maturity), 
divided by disposable income. This indicator is included under the “measures of private 
sector debt burden” heading proposed in ESRB Recommendation 2014/1 on the CCB.
The level of indebtedness of the private sector has shown a nearly constant decline since 
the beginning of the recent crisis (see Chart 3.1.D). This is consistent with the process of 
gradual and sustained correction of the high level of leverage reached in the sector in the 
run-up to the crisis. In other words, this indicator shows that the sector continues to adjust 
the imbalances built up and there are no signs that an expansionary phase has been 
initiated. Consequently, this indicator does not signal that the CCB should be activated.
Currently all information analysed, including the core indicators, consistently and 
sufficiently uniformly signals that the CCB need not be activated at this point in time. In 
this respect, the decision by the Banco de España in the first two quarters of 2016 was to 
hold at 0% the percentage of CCB applicable to credit exposures in Spain.
The credit intensity indicator 
seeks to capture information 
on the acceleration of credit 
growth 
The credit intensity indicator 
shows a change in trend but 
remains in negative territory 
The debt burden indicator 
seeks to capture information 
on the private sector’s debt 
servicing ability 
The behaviour of the indicator 
of non-financial private sector 
debt service is consistent with 
a process of gradual and 
sustained deleveraging in the 
sector 
The signs from all the 
indicators and information 
analysed are consistently and 
uniformly in favour of not 
activating the CCB at this 
point in time
7  The indicator used here was proposed for the first time in the context of early warning indicators for financial crises 
by Drehmann and Juselius (2012) and is currently considered as one of the main reference indicators along with the 
credit-to-GDP gap.
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The calibration of macroprudential instruments is generally done by means of a series of 
indicators specific to each instrument, as has been seen for instance with the countercyclical 
capital buffer. However, a general analysis of indicators may also prove very useful for detecting 
possible risks to financial stability and to establishing the broad macroprudential policy stance. 
In this respect, the European Systemic Risk Board recommends linking the intermediate 
objectives of macroprudential policy to instruments and indicators suited to monitoring 
possible risks and to guiding macroprudential decisions (ESRB/2013/1 Recommendation C). 
The Banco de España has developed a risk monitoring tool drawing on a set of over 100 
macroprudential indicators, the details of which were released in Banco de España 
Occasional Paper No. 1601. These indicators include information on developments in 
Spain in respect of credit; the housing market; the structure of liquidity and the maturities 
of bank assets and liabilities, credit portfolio concentration and NPLs in the banking 
system; and the situation on financial markets and developments in the real economy. The 
methodology applied allows this mass of information to be transformed into a heat map, 
which issues warnings on risks to the financial system and, more specifically, to the 
banking system. That is to say, it is a tool for viewing possible sources of systemic risks, 
ideally before they materialise in the form of losses, and for monitoring them over time. 
The original indicators bring together a broad dataset. Accordingly, a systematic methodology 
of analysis is advisable to ensure that the most significant information is extracted. This is done 
by means of the aggregation of the heat map into a smaller-scale map to make it more useful 
as a guideline for macroprudential policy, as explained in the aforementioned Occasional Paper 
No.1601. The aggregation takes into account the capacity of each indicator to warn about 
banking crises. In particular, the aggregation assigns a greater weight to those indicators that 
give an early warning about potential risks. Two additional aggregate categories that provide 
information on the actual conditions of the real economy and of banks at a specific time are 
also considered. Bearing in mind the position in the cycle at each point in time is important for 
properly regulating the macroprudential policy stance in terms of the current situation. 
Chart 3.2 depicts the situation as at the latest date available. Medium-level alerts are 
observed in concentration and in the banking situation. These alerts stem essentially from 
the pre-crisis imbalances having materialised in the form of higher NPLs. Since late 2012, 
a gradual improvement in actual conditions has been observed and the current alert level 
is low. The remaining categories have a low-alert status, in particular, credit and liquidity 
indicators, which indicates that there is currently no evidence of an acceleration in risks 
that jeopardise the stability of the Spanish financial system.
3.2 Analysis of 
macroprudential risks
The analysis of indicators can 
be of great use for detecting 
risks
The Banco de España has 
developed a risk monitoring 
tool that aggregates 
information on a broad set of 
indicators
Since late 2012, an 
improvement in the actual 
conditions of the economy 
and a gradual correction of the 
pre-crisis imbalances have 
been seen
HEAT MAP CHART 3.2
Credit
Liquidity
Concentration
IncentivesMacroeconomic imbalances
Real economy
NPL/Recourse to central bank
 DECEMBER 2006
 SEPTEMBER 2015
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
a The heat map levels are shown graphically. The concentric line closer to the center of the chart refers to a normal situation, while the higher the risk level, the 
greater the distance to the centre.
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4 ANNEX
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Difference between funds received in liquidity providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations. March 2016 data (latest available) and March 
2015 data, to maintain the year-on-year comparison.
b Difference calculated in basis points.
Dec 2015
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Dec 2015/
Dec 2014
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Dec 2014
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Dec 2015
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9.28.23.4910,601tnemnrevog lareneG
2.355.150.6009,159,1srotces etavirp rehtO
3.213.210.2727,944seitiruces tbed elbatekraM
7.42.50.8-185,171sevitavireD
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5.37.37.3-205,721seitilibail rehtO
7.298.294.2892,893,3SEITILIBAIL LATOT
Memorandum items
5.35.32.1-725,921)a( gnidnel ten metsysoruE   
7.66.66.4870,742sdnuf nwO
9.07.01.03665,43stseretni ytironiM
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0010015.2619,566,3YTIUQE DNA SEITILIBAIL LATOT
Assets
Liabilities and equity
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET.
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a Income statement for all deposit institutions.
Dec 2014 Dec 2015
€m
% Change
Dec 2015/Dec2014
% ATA % ATA
52.373.33.0-226,811eunever laicnaniF
92.125.13.21-541,74stsoc laicnaniF
69.158.15.9774,17emocni tseretni teN
40.050.04.9-665,1stnemurtsni latipac morf nruteR
00.209.10.9340,37emocni laicnanif teN
??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????? ??hod 1,718 -48.0 0.09 0.05
76.066.04.4135,42snoissimmoc teN
03.013.00.0548,01snoitcasnart laicnanif no sessol dna sniaG
60.0-90.0-.402,2-e (net)mocni gnitarepo rehtO
69.288.22.6439,701emocni ssorG
94.114.17.8112,45sesnepxe gnitarepO
74.174.18.3327,35emocni gnitarepo teN
  Asset impairment losses (speci?c and general provisions) 24,266 -9.2 0.76 0.66
61.051.06.21877,5)ten( esnepxe gninoisivorP
30.0-80.0.152,1-)ten( emocni rehtO
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ??) 22,428 -0.8 0.64 0.61
74.005.05.3-961,71emocni teN
Memorandum item
83.054.08.21-187,31noitutitsni tnerap eht ot detu?irtta emocnI    
Dec 2015
CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT
Deposit institutions (a)
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